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Abstract
How does the way a non-democratic leader takes power affect the stability of her gov-
ernment? Prior research identifies irregular leader entries—those violating the regime’s
norms for leader selection—to be especially likely to foreshadow subsequent unconstitu-
tional transitions. This paper shows how some forms of irregular leader entry can actu-
ally protect leaders from most threats of forced removal from power. When leaders use
a strong and loyal coalition of supporters to overthrow their predecessors and their entire
ruling regimes, as they do in successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-
changing coups, they explicitly prove their strength to any potential rivals. These leaders
are substantially less likely to be ousted than leaders who take power in ways that do not
convey strength so convincingly, such as normal succession and elite reshuffling. We an-
alyze an original dataset of non-democratic leader transitions and show that accounting
for the strength demonstrated during a leader’s entry to power substantially improves our
ability to predict how and when the leader will eventually leave office.
*NOTE: The data and all computer code necessary to replicate the results and figures in this analysis will
be made publicly available at the authors’ homepage on publication. R and Stata 14 were used for all statistical
analyses.
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How does the way a non-democratic leader takes power affect the stability of her govern-
ment? Previous research shows irregular1 transitions can undermine governance by increasing
the likelihood of political violence, slowing economic growth, and perpetuating cycles of un-
constitutional regime change (Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991; Campos and Nugent, 2002;
Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Collier et al., 2003; Feng, 1997; Fosu, 2002; Gleditsch and Rug-
geri, 2010; Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009; Gupta, 1990; Igbal and Zorn, 2008; Jones
and Olken, 2005, 2009; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Londregan and Poole, 1990; Lehoucq and Pérez-
Linán, 2014; Miller, 2012; Thyne et al., 2014). This link between irregular leader change and
regime fragility is well-established. Some researchers even approximate a state’s capacity to
govern with the way its leader claimed power, with regular entries marking strong states and ir-
regular entries defining especially weak ones (Huntington, 1968; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010).
But by amalgamating many different forms of irregular entry, this literature overlooks
how more specific transition types can influence the kinds of threats a leader will face during
her time in power. Irregular entry is a broad concept that includes significant and disruptive
transitions like rebellions and foreign invasions as well as less consequential internal reshuffles
and succession disputes. This inclusive concept does not differentiate contentious transitions
between rivals within the same ruling clique from transitions that completely oust the ruling
elite and overturn the political structures that kept them in power. We draw on work on oppo-
sition coordination in dictatorships (Casper and Tyson, 2014; Edmond, 2013; Geddes, 1999;
Kuran, 1989; Karklins and Peterson, 1993; Lohmann, 1993; Little, 2015) to argue that we can
learn much more about the political consequences of leader entry by disaggregating these ir-
regular transitions into two substantively important types: irregular regime replacement and
irregular regime reorganization.
Foundational research on leader survival in dictatorships suggests all non-democratic
leaders should be very interested in conveying strength and invulnerability. Doing so convinc-
ingly increases one’s chances of keeping power, while doing so unconvincingly invites chal-
lenges and compels dictators to make concessions, share power, and accept constraints (Boix
1Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009: 272) define regular leader transitions as those that occur “according
to the prevailing rules, provisions, conventions, and norms of the country.”
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and Svolik, 2013; Svolik, 2009; Magaloni, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008;
Smith, 2005). This pressure to appear strong gives rise to a classic signaling problem: all dic-
tators, strong and weak alike, do what they can to appear invulnerable while their challengers
must attempt to discern which claims of strength are actually credible. We contend that some
leaders prove the strength and loyalty of their supporting coalitions by forcibly overthrowing
their predecessors and overhauling their political systems. These forms of irregular regime re-
placement include successful rebellions, popular uprisings, and major regime-changing coups
d’état. In each of these entry types a sufficiently strong coalition accepted considerable risks
and costs to install their chosen leader. This credible show-of-strength can deter aspiring rivals
from plotting their own attempts to dislodge the new leader from office.
Other forms of irregular leader entry do not convincingly convey the strength of a new
leader’s coalition of supporters. There is much more ambiguity around leader strength when
they enter by irregular regime reorganization, as in reshuffles among the ruling elite, extraor-
dinary appointments during political crises, or unestablished election or selection processes.
These leaders may have very strong support underlying their claims to power—and most lead-
ers in this position work very hard to persuade their new constituents of their invulnerability—
but their claims of strength cannot be as credible as those made by new leaders who proved the
strength of their supporting coalitions while forcibly ousting a predecessor’s regime. Follow-
ing regime reorganizations, new leaders can only attempt to persuade potential rivals of their
strength with propaganda, public demonstrations, and repression. There is much less ambigu-
ity around the strength of a leader’s hold on power when that leader forced her way in with a
strong coalition that would presumably rise up to the leader’s defense. Below, we estimate non-
democratic leaders who entered office through regime replacement to be three to five times less
likely to be forced from power relative to those who entered by irregular regime reorganization.
Non-democratic leaders who take power through irregular regime replacement are un-
likely to suffer similar challenges relative to other dictators, but there are two notable caveats
to this argument: this stabilizing effect is short-lived and limited to only a few types of threats.
Strong supporting coalitions deter challenges that would require a rival to compete with and
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overcome a leader’s coalition (i.e. direct confrontation through war, street protests, and other
forms of complete regime change), but they may encourage tactics that circumvent direct en-
gagement with a new leader’s coalition, such as assassination. Furthermore, political alle-
giances shift while new leaders consolidate power and develop new alliances. Over time a
leader’s entry coalition can become decreasingly representative of the support she enjoys in the
present. Thus, the more time a leader has been in power, the less reliably her method of entry
predicts the threats she will face while in office.
The paper makes three contributions to the literature on political instability in dictator-
ships. First, the distinction between irregular regime replacement and irregular regime reor-
ganization greatly improves our ability to forecast different threats to non-democratic rulers.
Second, the paper introduces new data that describe eleven forms of leader exit and eight forms
of leader entry. These data will allow for more nuanced cross-national studies of authoritarian
breakdowns and transitions. Finally, we refine the established wisdom about the “coup traps”
(Londregan and Poole, 1990; Lehoucq and Pérez-Linán, 2014) and “conflict traps” (Collier
et al., 2003) that purportedly condemn dictatorships to long cycles of instability. Some leaders
are ensnared in these traps and suffer short-lived and tumultuous tenures, but those who force-
fully take power with strong coalitions credibly signal their strength, deter rivals, and earn a
short reprieve from these kinds of challenges.
The Argument
We derive our argument about how specific forms of entry predict the threats leaders will face
from four claims. First, a leader’s political survival relies upon her ability to maintain a strong
supporting coalition, but in non-democracies allegiances are private and therefore prone to
misperception. Second, leader entry by forced regime replacement reveals valuable information
about the true strength of the leader’s coalition, and this information cannot be signaled as
convincingly by other forms of entry. Third, political rivals use this information to form their
estimates of a leader’s coalition strength and their chances of success should they try to seize
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power. And fourth, the value of any information about leader coalition strength to be gleaned
from the leader’s entry into power depreciates quickly, as does the influence this information
has on those looking to challenge the leader.
Political Allegiances and Uncertainty in Non-Democratic States
Leaders stay in power by maintaining a strong and loyal coalition of supporters (Ames, 1987;
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Svolik, 2012; Sudduth, 2017).
Leaders of democracies do this by attracting a bloc of voters that is large enough to defeat
rival voting coalitions at the polls. Political competition is less transparent in non-democratic
states, but leader coalitions in these systems are typically comprised of adequate shares of the
public, the military, and the political elite.2 Non-democratic leaders stay in power by ensuring
that their coalition remains strong enough to overcome any rival coalitions. They do this by si-
multaneously incentivizing loyalty among their supporters with private goods provisions while
obstructing rivals with repression and the threat or use of political violence (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006; Bell, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith,
2015; Conrad, 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2008, 2012).
A defining characteristic of non-democratic politics is the absence of regular, transparent,
and competitive contests for power that reveal the true size and strength of a leader’s coalition of
supporters. This is certainly true where there are no elections to allow opposition leaders to vie
for power against the incumbent, though it is also true where election results are manipulated
so as to obscure a leader’s true level of support (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Daxecker, 2014;
Levitsky and Way, 2010; González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2015). Even in
the increasing share of non-democratic regimes with multi-party elections, these contests are
usually superficial and the results typically favor the incumbent due to outright distortion of the
vote tallies or by policies that place challengers at an insurmountable structural disadvantage
(Gandhi, 2008; Schedler, 2006, 2013).3
2For more on how a leader’s specific sources of support vary in different styles of dictatorship, see, among
others: Gandhi (2008); Geddes (1999, 2003); Svolik (2012).
3For a more thorough exploration of electoral manipulation in dictatorships than space allows, see Schedler’s
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Non-democratic leaders intensify uncertainty about the size of their supporting coali-
tions by exaggerating their support and exacerbating opposition coordination problems (Ed-
mond, 2013; Lohmann, 1993; Kuran, 1989). These efforts suppress movements to remove
non-democratic leaders from office because regime opponents cannot accurately juxtapose the
strength of the opposition movement against that of the leader’s supporting coalition. Lohmann’s
1994 study of East Germany describes a country that could have democratized much earlier had
the opposition understood its relative strength. Of the uncertainty before the eventual collapse
of the German Democratic Republic, she writes:
“While elections were held regularly, there was no opposition party, and election
outcomes were manipulated. Periodic intraparty purges effectively eliminated any
opposition within the ruling party. The freedom of press, radio, and television
guaranteed in Article 27 of the GDR constitution was a farce... public opinion
polls that indicated a dramatic decrease in public support for the regime in the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s were classified and not accessible to anyone but
high-level functionaries” (pg. 44).
The uncertainty around leader coalitions is worsened by strong incentives to misrepresent
allegiances in non-democratic systems. In democracies, leaders provide their large electorates
with public goods that are largely non-excludable, meaning the goods one receives from the
government are minimally influenced by one’s political affiliations (Boix, 2003; Brown and
Mobarak, 2009; Deacon, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Lake and Baum, 2001; Olson,
1993).4 The same cannot be said of non-democratic states. Where opposition leaders and their
followers are repressed, there are strong incentives to publicly voice support for an incumbent
whom one may not support privately—known political opponents can face lower levels of
goods provision or even state-sponsored violence (Bueno deMesquita et al., 2003; Kuran, 1989,
1991).5 For these two reasons—(1) the absence of mechanisms that force public declarations
of support for competing candidates for executive office and (2) the strong incentives to feign
The Politics of Uncertainty (2013), Competitive Authoritarianism by Levitsky and Way (2010), and Political
Institutions under Dictatorship by Gandhi (2008).
4Goods distribution is not perfectly equal in democracies (Bell, 2011; Keefer, 2007; Min, 2015; Ross, 2006),
though disparities are smaller than what is observed in non-democracies.
5Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) call this the “loyalty norm” that helps to preserve non-democratic winning
coalitions.
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support for the incumbent—political allegiances in non-democracies are private and prone to
miscalculation. This increases the value of events that reveal a leader’s true level of support.
Leader Transitions as Information-Revealing Events
The problem described above resembles a classic signaling game. Non-democratic leaders
hold private information about the strength of the coalitions keeping them in power. They also
have incentives to exaggerate their strength to any potential rivals, all of whom possess less
information about the leader’s true strength. The likely outcome of this signaling problem is
what formal theorists call a pooling strategy; all dictators do what they can to convey strength.
Whether strong or weak, these leaders have incentives to hold sham elections, make examples
of political rivals, glorify their successes, control state media, hold militaristic celebrations and
parades, and create new holidays and national myths. Any potential challengers must attempt
to discern credible signals of strength from empty bluffs, but guessing incorrectly can have
devastating consequences. So how can the opposition determine which leaders are truly strong
and which ones are feigning support?6
The central argument of this paper is that some, though not all, forms of leader entry
provide a credible snapshot of the support a new leader enjoys when she takes power. Forms of
entry that unequivocally advertise a strong supporting coalition provide the most unambiguous
signal of strength. Leaders achieve this by forcibly seizing power and replacing the preceding
political system. When a new leader takes power at the head of a rebel army or popular protest
movement, the strength and loyalty of her coalition is evinced by their victory over the previous
government. Potential opponents can have no doubt that the new leader has the support of a
loyal and risk-acceptant bloc of supporters. Major coups that overturn the entire ruling regime
(rather than less consequential reshuffling coups) also demonstrate that the new leader’s coali-
tion is strong and loyal enough to resist threats to the new government. When popular protests
overwhelm a government and place a chosen leader in power, observers can infer that public
opposition to subsequent regime change would be great enough to discourage efforts to remove
6See, among others, the foundational “beer-quiche” game in which both beer-drinkers and quiche-eaters opt
for beer so as to signal their toughness to a nearby bully (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
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the new incumbent by force. In this way, coming to power through irregular regime replace-
ment can be a boon to new leaders hoping to avoid counter-coups and reactionary uprisings.
Table 1: How Leader Entry Signals Leader Strength
ENTRY TYPE DEFINITION UNCERTAINTY ABOUT LEADER STRENGTH
Regular Entry consistent with constitutional or Moderate. New leader has no chance
Entry established rules for leader selection, to display her strength when she
such as normal succession, selection by inherits the status quo regime. Entry
party/junta elites, or popular election. does not reveal whether she is strongly
supported or passively accepted by
those beyond the ruling inner circle.
Irregular Entry either violates rules/norms or High. A reshuffle between insiders in
Reorganization occurs where there are no established the governing clique may reveal a new
rules/norms AND leader rose without leader’s popularity among the ruling
forcefully ousting the old regime, as in elite, but it can also advertise the
reshuffles or unestablished election, weakness of the regime to political
succession, or selection processes. rivals outside the ruling clique.
Irregular Entry violates established rules or Low. The new leader took power
Replacement norms for leader change AND change with a sufficiently strong and loyal
results from the coordinated use of coalition of supporters. The new leader’s
force, as in rebellions, major regime strength is made credible by her success
changing coups, and protest movements. in forcing the previous leader from office
against the will of the ruling elite.
When leaders enter power in other ways they cannot convey strength so persuasively. For
example, leaders who take power during intra-junta/party reshuffles demonstrate that they have
the support of a critical share of the divided ruling elites, but these entries do nothing to deter
outsiders who hope to overturn the entire political system. Rather, these regime reorganizations
only show that the new leader is the strongest member of an increasingly fractured government.
Even when these leadership disputes turn violent, as in many “palace coups” or “reshuffling
coups,” new leaders only prove that they can force the allegiances of regime insiders. These
irregular regime reorganizations allow leaders to arise from internal discord and do not credibly
demonstrate that the new coalition is strong enough to take control of the state and thwart threats
from regime outsiders.
Regular entries that follow a regime’s established norms for leader transition are a hall-
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mark of stable dictatorships, but these transitions reveal relatively little about the size and loy-
alty of a new leader’s coalition. Loyalties do not automatically transfer from a monarch to
an heir or from a president to a vice president, and this is why new leaders are so frequently
challenged shortly after succeeding their predecessors. Historical studies of Europe’s heredi-
tary monarchies suggest succession mechanisms provide stability by dissuading intra-regime
infighting, (Kokkonen and Sundell, 2014; Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2000), but family monarchies are
increasingly rare (Brownlee, 2007) and these norms may not dissuade regime outsiders. Isabel
Perón of Argentina was the clear chosen successor of Juan Perón—she was his wife and vice
president—yet she suffered multiple coup attempts and was deposed less than two years after
taking power. Kim Jong Un continues to serve as the North Korean President, but his suc-
cession was followed by numerous purges, executions, and other demonstrations of strength.
International observers continue to question the strength of his coalition, warning that a poten-
tial rival could emerge. He did not force his way into office in a complete regime replacement,
so we can only speculate about his true level of support within the North Korean military elite.
Which Threats Are Deterred By Credible Signals of Strength?
The unambiguous signal of strength that occurs when a new leader forcibly replaces her prede-
cessor should deter challengers, though some forms of leader removal should be more sensitive
to leader coalition strength than others. Specifically, strong coalitions should deter coalition
competition that pits a leader’s supporters against an opposition coalition in a direct contest
for state control. These forms of removal include civil wars where rebel groups directly en-
gage with forces defending the incumbent’s government, coup attempts that seek to overthrow
(rather than reshuffle) the government, and popular movements where opposition groups con-
front the incumbent’s supporters in the streets. Coalition-competing threats should be deterred
by reliable information about leader coalition strength because the viability of these challenges
crucially depends upon opponents’ beliefs about the relative strength of the leader’s coalition.7
7Little 2015 and Casper and Tyson 2014 similarly argue political rivals can make inferences about non-
democratic leader strength following elections and protests, respectively, though perceptions of both events may
be prone to government manipulation and state-controlled media.
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Table 2: How Involuntary Leader Exits Are Affected By Signals of Leader Strength
REMOVAL TYPE DEFINITION SENSITIVITY TO LEADER STRENGTH
Coalition Unconstitutional removal in which High. The viability of the attempt
Competing a coalition of regime outsiders depends upon the relative strength
overthrows the ruling government of the incumbent’s supporters
in a direct competition for power. vis-á-vis the opposition coalition.
Coalition Unconstitutional removal where Low. The viability of the challenge
Circumventing regime outsiders evade direct is minimally influenced by leader
competition with the incumbent’s strength because challengers avoid
coalition by using assassins or direct coalition competition or use
turning to foreign superpowers. substantially stronger foreign allies.
Coalition The leader is forced from power Low. The viability of the challenge
Collapsing involuntarily during reshuffling is minimally influenced by leader
among members of the regime, strength because challengers emerge
usually in “palace coups d’état” from within the regime and convince
or pseudo-legal impeachments. others to reallocate political power.
Other threats to leaders eschew direct competition between the coalitions of the leader
and an opposition movement and, therefore, should not be similarly deterred by demonstrations
of leader coalition strength. We call these forms of removal coalition circumvention. Assas-
sins, for example, remove a leader from power with no intention of overcoming the leader’s
supporters and placing an opposition member in power. When the ruler of the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, Laurent Kabila, was assassinated by a child soldier in 1999, the young
assassin surely was not attempting to place himself or another regime outsider in office. This
threat to Kabila occurred despite the strength of his supporting coalition. Kabila’s formidable
coalition—his son is now approaching two decades in power—could have been a primary mo-
tivation for using a removal tactic that would intentionally circumvent coalition competition.
Opponents also circumvent competition with they enlist global or regional superpowers to re-
move the incumbent from office. Non-democratic leaders suffer foreign overthrows relatively
infrequently (we count only 24 since 1950), but when they do they are typically overthrown by
states that are far too strong to be meaningfully deterred by the way in which a leader came
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to power. American actions against Mohammad Mossadeg (Iran, 1953) and Mullah Omar
(Afghanistan, 2001) typify the overwhelming strength of the foreign country during these tran-
sitions, as do French actions against Bokassa (C.A.R., 1979) and Soviet moves against Nagy
(Hungary, 1956), Karmal (Afghanistan, 1986), and Tsedenbal (Mongolia, 1984).
Having had a strong coalition at the time of entry does little to protect leaders from
threats emerging from within the coalition. These kinds of threats do not force challengers to
overcome the coalition that put the leader in power. Rather, they constitute reshuffles among
coalition members that demote the incumbent leader. We call these internal realignments and
reshuffles coalition collapse. This form of removal includes two ways that leaders are invol-
untarily replaced by members of their own governments: reshuffling coups and legal processes
like impeachment. Because these forms of removal do not require challengers to overcome the
leader’s united coalition, these threats should be minimally affected by any signals sent by a
leader’s method of entry into office.
It follows from this argument that the irregular regime replacements that send the most
unambiguous signals of leader coalition strength should dissuade the coalition competing threats
that are most sensitive to the strength of an incumbent’s supporting coalition. Forms of removal
that are minimally affected by coalition strength vis-à-vis outsiders should not be similarly de-
terred by irregular regime replacement. Accordingly:
H1: Non-democratic leaders coming to power via irregular regime replacement are
less likely to suffer removal by coalition competition.
H2: Non-democratic leaders coming to power via irregular regime replacement are
no less likely to suffer removal by coalition circumvention or collapse.
Signals of Strength Will Fade Over Time
The argument requires a final caveat. The importance of any signal fades with time, both be-
cause the information conveyed by the signal is less recent and, in this context, because political
realities often force dictators to reconstitute their supporting coalitions. Work on the institution-
alization of non-democratic governments highlights both of these time-sensitive mechanisms.
When necessary, dictators rebuild their coalitions using strategies like purging, ideological re-
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alignment, and political party formation (Sudduth, 2017; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svo-
lik, 2012). Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for example, famously rose to power in a coup
supported by fundamentalist Islamists like the theocrat Hassan al-Turabi. Islamism was promi-
nent in the early years of his regime, but al-Bashir severed his ties to this movement once he
consolidated power and gained the ability to personalize his regime. Over the course of al-
Bashir’s 25 years in office his government has gone from courting al Qaeda and aggressively
pursuing Islamization to jailing Hassan al-Turabi and calling the Muslim Brotherhood a terror-
ist organization. This is a clear example of how the way a leader entered power becomes less
relevant as political conditions change with time.
Even where leaders are somewhat less intentional about reshaping their supporting coali-
tions, we would argue that the passage of time depreciates the value of the information provided
by a leader’s entry and therefore weakens any deterrent effect that an irregular regime replace-
ment might have on subsequent political challenges. Fidel Castro’s successful revolution in
Cuba provided opponents with a much better understanding of Fidel’s military strength in the
early 1960s than it did in the early 2000s. Thus, we posit an additional conditional hypothesis:
H3: The magnitude of any relationship between leader entry type and leader exit
type will fade with a leader’s time in office.
Data
Our dataset of non-democratic leader transitions consists of leader-year panels for the 773
individuals who took control of a non-democratic government between 1950 and 2016 and
then held power for at least one week.8 To generate this leader list, we first used the data
and coding rules produced by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) to identify periods of
non-democratic rule in every sovereign state. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) use a
8The “one-week rule” is standard practice in this research literature because many contested leader transitions
see power change hands several times over the course of the conflict. Without an arbitrary threshold for time-
in-power, many failed coups would produce temporary “leaders” who served for a few hours and never emerged
from the initial conflict for power with any real capacity to govern. See, for example, the failed coup in Sudan that
occurred 19-23 July 1971.
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procedural definition of democracy that labels governments non-democratic if executive offices
are not filled through legitimate and contested elections. According to this definition, 141
countries were non-democratic at some point between 1950 and 2016.
Next, we consulted several datasets and codebooks (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland,
2010; Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009; Svolik and Akcinaroglu, 2007) to create a list
of leaders serving during these non-democratic periods, taking special care to correctly assign
leaders to regimes during years that experienced major regime change. These sources occasion-
ally disagree about the identity of a country’s chief leader because some favor nominal heads-
of-government while others list the de facto or “effective” leader. We resolved these differences
by doing case research to identify de facto leaders. Finally, we excluded the short-lived tenures
of “leaders” who merely served as placeholders (i.e. Kebreau in Haiti). We recoded 93 (out
of 773) leaders in our dataset as placeholders and excluded them from our analyses. Our main
findings do not substantially change when they are included, though including them increases
the estimated probability of a voluntary resignation and decreases estimated likelihoods of all
irregular forms of leader removal. We provide a complete list of our leaders, placeholders, and
transition types in a supplementary appendix.9
Leader Entry Types
We assign each leader one of eight entry types. Most non-democratic leader transitions are
regular and voluntary, meaning that they are not forced by a major crisis and they occur with
the consent of the outgoing regime. If such transitions occur as part of a precedented pro-
cess for leader selection, as in regular elections, succession structures, and normal selection
by the party/junta, then we label these Regular Selection/Election. Leaders entering this way
include most heirs in monarchies, rising party members, and winners of precedented elections.
If the entry was unprecedented but otherwise peaceful and voluntary, as in first-time transi-
9Using two independent coders, we were able to achieve an inter-coder reliability of 97% after the first at-
tempt to construct the data. Additional sources were consulted to classify the more ambiguous cases, many of
which involved uncertainty about the role of foreign actors or whether assassinations were part of larger coup or
rebel conspiracies. We identified placeholders using the LEAD data and coding rules from Ellis, Horowitz and
Stam (2015). All decisions and a leader-by-leader comparison to Archigos (4.1) are included in a supplementary
appendix.
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tions between regime founders and their heirs (e.g. Fidel to Raul Castro in Cuba) or initial
appointments at state independence (e.g. Sékou Touré in Guinea), we code the entry as First
Selection/Election. We make this distinction so we can determine whether regular forms of
leader entry better insulate leaders from challenges if those regular entries are legitimized by
historical precedent. These two types of leader entry describe about half of the 773 leaders in
the dataset, with 259 entering by Regular Election/Selection (33.5%) and 172 (22.3%) rising
through First Election/Selection.
Nearly half of all non-democratic leaders entered in more tumultuous “irregular” transi-
tions, but we differentiate between six different forms of irregular entry. When governments
are compelled to choose a new leader during a major crisis, such as a popular protest or assassi-
nation, we call this Forced Election/Selection. These entries are different from other irregular
entries in that the outgoing government chooses the new leader during the crisis. These en-
tries are not common (88 of 773, or 11.4%), but high-profile examples include Egypt’s Hosni
Mubarak following the killing of Anwar Sadat and Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo, who first
entered office when a botched coup attempt failed to oust the ruling regime but succeeded in
killing the leader of the junta in which Obasanjo served. These entries can also occur during
war if a war forces the old leader out, yet does not put a rebel leader in power. The rebellion
against Charles Taylor in Liberia’s second civil war (1999-2003) removed Taylor, but when he
vacated office his position transferred to a regime insider, Vice President Moses Blah, rather
than someone affiliated with the rebel movement. This ascent, despite being triggered by war,
is a Forced Election/Selection.
All other forms of entry occur without the consent of the government. Foreign Installa-
tion (20 leaders, 2.6%) occurs when new leaders are put in place by the governments of other
countries. These transitions require more than foreign assistance (as in some coups and re-
bellions). Instead, the foreign government must be the main armed force that selects the new
leader. Successful Rebellion (27 leaders, 3.5%) and Successful Protest (4 leaders, 0.5%) oc-
cur when governments are forced from power and the leaders of the rebel or protest movements
claim power for themselves. Finally, we follow Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2015) by making
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a distinction between two types of coups: the Reshuffling Coup that puts a new individual
in charge of the extant political regime and the Regime-Changing Coup in which the new
leader significantly and immediately changes political institutions and/or the nature of exec-
utive power.10 Taken together, Reshuffling Coups (95 leaders, 12.3%) and Regime-Changing
Coups (108 leaders, 14.0%) account for one in four non-democratic leader entries.
Next, we classify these eight types into the broader theoretically-relevant categories dis-
cussed above (also see Table 3 below). The only regular methods are Regular Election/Selection
and First Election/Selection. In both cases power is transferred voluntarily by the previous gov-
ernment. Irregular regime reorganizations occur when the change is involuntary, yet the ruling
regime is minimally changed, as in a Forced Election/Selection or Reshuffling Coup. Irregular
regime replacements occur during a Regime-Changing Coup, Successful Protest, or Successful
Rebellion. Foreign Installation is a distinct category.
Leader Exit Types
Because we theorize that strong leader coalitions dissuade some strategies for leader removal
but not others, we also classify leader exits into several types. Voluntary Resignation occurs
when leader exit is completely voluntary (378 leaders, 48.9%) or forced only by failing health
(8 leaders, 1.0%). An additional 53 leaders (6.9%) exited through Natural Death. Rumors
surround leader deaths and resignations in dictatorships, but we code these events as health-
induced unless there is very strong evidence that false health reports were used as a pretext for
a more nefarious plot to force the leader from power.
We code two kinds of involuntary removal from within the regime (coalition collapse).
A Reshuffling Coup occurs when a leader is forcibly removed by a secret internal faction that
splits her coalition. These coups do not overthrow the entire government, but instead change
the leadership structure among the ruling elite. 83 of the non-democratic leaders who entered
power after 1950 (10.7%) lost power this way. Leaders can also be forced out under legal pre-
tenses. These instances of Legal Removal are involuntary and undermine the internal cohesion
10We expand their dataset to include more coups and a longer time period. We also recoded some coups. All of
these decisions are included in the online appendix.
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of the regime, but they use available legal structures for removal rather than subversive coup
conspiracies. We count only 19 cases (2.5%), including Razak’s faction of Malaysia’s UMNO
party successfully overcoming Tunku Abdul Rahman, the country’s first prime minister. These
forms of coalition collapse similarly pit one faction of the ruling coalition against the other,
though the former is usually a secret conspiracy while the latter is often a prolonged and public
legal battle.
We divide threats emerging from outside the ruling coalition into two broad categories:
coalition competition and coalition circumvention (refer to Table 2). Coalition-competing
methods of leader removal are most likely to be deterred by a strong leader because they require
a challenger to forcibly remove the governing coalition. The three types of coalition-competing
removal are: Regime-Changing Coup (66 leaders, 8.5%), Protest (31 leaders, 4.0%), and Re-
bellion (28 leaders, 3.6%). Note that the number of leaders to leave power in these ways will
not perfectly align with the number of leaders to enter in these ways. For example, 31 leaders
were forced out by protests but only 4 leaders entered through protest. A primary cause for
this is democratization; those who enter after successful protests often democratize and this is
a dataset of non-democratic leaders.
Our last two forms of leader removal are Assassination (19 leaders, 2.5%) and Foreign
Overthrow (24 leaders, 3.1%). We consider both of these exit types to be different from the
coalition-competing challenges listed above because neither is particularly deterred by leader
strength. Assassination attempts that are not linked to larger conspiracies and are not deterred
by a leader’s coalition strength because “lone-wolf” assassins have no intention of combating
a leader’s coalition of supporters. Foreign governments with the capacity to overthrow other
states’ incumbents are much stronger than their targets.
Control Variables
We anticipate any consequences of leader entry type to be tempered by the amount of time
a leader has held power, so the models also include Leader Tenure measured in logged years
and some models also include multiplicative interactions of tenure with specific entry types.
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Table 3: A Typology of Leader Entry and Exit
LEADER ENTRY
REGULAR IRREGULAR IRREGULAR FOREIGN
ENTRY REPLACEMENT REORGANIZATION INSTALLATION
Regular Selection Rebellion Reshuffle Coup Installation
First Selection Protest Forced Selection
Regime Coup
LEADER EXIT
VOLUNTARY NATURAL COALITION COALITION COALITION
RESIGNATION DEATH COMPETITION CIRCUMVENTION COLLAPSE
Election/Selection Death Rebellion Foreign Action Reshuffle Coup
Health Reasons Regime Coup Assassination Legal Removal
Protest
Age is included so we can better separate the effects of tenure longevity from other time trends
like waning health and perceptions of leader frailty. We include Logged pcGDP to capture a
state’s level of economic development, anticipating that states with a lower per capita gross
domestic product will be more prone to irregular forms of leader change. Economic Growth is
measured as the annual change in per capita gross domestic product and we expect higher rates
of economic growth to decrease the risk of irregular forms of leader change. Both economic
variables are drawn from The Maddison Project (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014). Different non-
democratic political systems are likely to suffer different kinds of challenges. Using the data
by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), we account for whether the regime is a monarchic,
military, or civilian dictatorship. Monarch andMilitary Dictator are dichotomous variables in-
dicating whether the regime’s decision-making relies on family and kin networks, or the armed
forces within juntas. The base category in our analyses is a civilian dictatorship. In addition,
we control for Party which is a dichotomous variable indicating whether there is any de facto
party ruling the regime.
Conflict involvement is also linked to leader survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;
Goemans, 2008; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Debs and Goemans, 2010), so we use several
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control variables to indicate the presence of conflict, a leader’s role in the conflict, and re-
cent performance in conflict. We include a dichotomous Civil War variable that is equal to 1
when states are presently involved in a civil war, drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset v.4-2012 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012). We expect that
ongoing war increases the risk of an irregular leader replacement. We also include Logged Mil-
itary Personnel to capture an additional aspect of state militarization (Singer, 1987). Leaders
are rewarded for success in international conflicts and may be punished for defeat (Debs and
Goemans, 2010), so we also include three measures of recent Victory,Defeat, andDraw in prior
conflicts. Following this work, we expect these effects to depreciate with time and capture this
with a decay function.11 The original source of this data on qualifying crises and results is the
International Crisis Behavior dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000).
Analysis
Leaders confront simultaneous threats of many different forms of removal, and consequently
the risk of one type must be evaluated relative to the risk of any others. Statistical models that
predict the risk of only one form of leader exit are insufficient because they cannot provide
adequate information about these competing threats. For example, a model that estimates the
risk of removal by coalition competition could not differentiate between one leader who faces
a low risk because she is very likely to stay in power and another leader who faces a low risk
because she is much more likely to voluntarily resign, die in office, or be overthrown by a
foreign power. Understanding leader exit requires an estimation strategy that is more sensitive
to the simultaneous threats leaders suffer.
We overcome this problem by using multinomial logit models that predict the relative
likelihoods of six possible outcomes each year a leader is in power: (1) staying in power,
(2) removal by coalition competition, (3) removal by coalition circumvention, (4) removal by
coalition collapse, (5) voluntary resignation, or (6) natural death.12 This method produces a
11These variables are equal to 1
t−tR+1
where tR is the year of the outcome and t is the year observed.
12As a robustness check, we ran multinomial logit models by coding the natural death as censored cases. The
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unique prediction for each of the six possible outcomes for each year of a leader’s tenure and
these predictions always sum to 1 (or 100%). We use “staying in power” as the base category
and present the results for each of the five exit types.
In Table 4 we interact each entry category with the log(Tenure) variable to see how each
form of entry influences the risk of each form of exit during a leader’s time in power. We use Ir-
regular Replacement Entry as our base category so that all estimates are relative to leaders who
entered power in this way. A positive coefficient on another entry type means those leaders are
more likely than a leader who entered through irregular regime replacement to experience that
kind of leader exit in their first year in power. Our hypotheses would therefore expect strong
positive relationships between the other entry types and coalition-competing removal with neg-
ative interactions between the other entry types and time in power (H1 and H3). Meanwhile,
we would expect there is no statistically significant relationships between each entry type and
coalition-circumventing or coalition-collapsing removal (H2). As many implications of inter-
action terms can be difficult to diagnose from these coefficients alone, we graphically illustrate
the effect of leader entry type on each exit type calculated as the first difference in Figures 1
and 2.
The first column of results in Table 4 shows how leader entry influences the risk of a
coalition-competing exit (removal by rebellion, protest, or regime-changing coup). The pos-
itive and significant coefficients for Regular Entry and Irregular Reorganization Entry show
that, as predicted, leaders coming to power in these ways are significantly more likely than
leaders who entered in regime replacements to suffer these kinds of challenges early in their
tenures. Furthermore, in accordance with the third hypothesis, the negative coefficients on the
interaction terms between these entry categories and leader tenure indicate this effect dimin-
ishes over a leader’s time in power.
To visualize this, we plot the effect of irregular regime replacement entry on the risk of
a coalition-competing exit across leader tenure in Figure 1. The effect of irregular regime
replacement entry is calculated as the first difference, a change in the risk of a coalition-
results are reported in the online appendix and are consistent with the results shown in the main text.
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Table 4: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships
Model 1
Dependent Variable Coalition Coalition Coalition Voluntary Natural
Exit Manner Competing Circumventing Collapsing Resignation Death
Base Category
Entry Manner Irregular Replacement Entry
Independent Variables
Regular Entry 1.885*** -1.823 .306 -.198 -1.055
(.660) ( 1.247) (.446 ) ( .505 ) ( 1.223)
Regular × log(Tenure) -.510* .868 -.358 .379* .360
(.273) ( .627) (.265) ( .224) ( .435 )
Irregular Reorganization Entry 2.575*** .425 .352 .483 -.743
( .535 ) ( 1.021) ( .533) ( .466 ) ( .954 )
Reorganization × log(Tenure) -.776*** .209 .424 .108 .334
( .287) (.720 ) ( .311 ) (.267 ) ( .429 )
Foreign Entry .741 -.045 -14.380*** -2.638 -13.132***
(1.806) ( .955) ( .745 ) ( 2.301 ) ( 1.498)
Foreign × log(Tenure) .349 .840 .771* 1.104* -.399
(.851) ( .672) ( .422) (.664) ( .485 )
Log(Tenure) .632*** -.591 -.507** -.453** .090
(.204) ( .441) (.222) (.213) (.347)
Controls
ln(GDP/capita) -.354*** .025 -.209 .116 -.329
( .136) (.150 ) ( .129 ) ( .138) ( .217)
GDP Growth -3.235*** -1.80 -.172 -.544 -.030
( .867) ( 1.686) ( .600) ( .777) ( .224)
Military Dictatorship -.082 .252 .714** .657*** .056
( .300) ( .501) ( .340) ( .251) ( .527)
Monarchy -2.082*** -.497 -.373 -.777 1.476**
( .796 ) ( .583) ( .591 ) ( .608) ( .618)
Party -2.057*** -.428 -.739** 1.058** -.284
( .399) (.547 ) ( .339) ( .429 ) ( .672)
Ln(Military Personnel) -.166* .078 -.074 .048 .135
( .096) (.151 ) ( .075) (.061) ( .118 )
Civil War 1.861*** .899* .392 .250 -.647
( .274) ( .473 ) ( .347 ) (.232) ( .562 )
War Victory -2.383* -7.184** -5.272 -2.305 1.180**
( 1.243 ) (2.946 ) ( 3.693) ( 1.462) ( .583)
War Defeat .962* 3.095*** .533 -.010 .710
( .513) ( .587 ) ( .725) ( .689) ( .565)
War Draw -.569 -1.251 -.813 -.846 .484
( .489) ( 1.032) ( .627) ( .658) ( .656)
Age .041*** .048** .025** .045*** .061***
( .013) ( .021 ) ( .011 ) ( .010) ( .012)
Constant -3.682*** -7.130*** -2.565*** -7.388*** -6.529***
(.943) (1.332) ( .901 ) ( .942) ( 1.532)
Log Likelihood -1459.863
Observations 3613
Note: Robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. We
provide the first differences predicted from this model in Figures 1 and 2.
competing exit a leader would suffer when her entry type is switched from either regular or
irregular reorganization to irregular replacement when all other variables in the model are held
constant at their means or medians. We used Model 1 in Table 4 to estimate the first differ-
ences. As predicted by our first hypothesis, Figure 1 shows that leaders who enter through
irregular regime replacements are less likely to suffer removal by coalition competition than
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Figure 1: Effect of Irregular Replacement Entry on Coalition-Competing Removal
−
0.
01
5
−
0.
01
0
−
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
0.
02
0
Tenure
Pr
(C
om
pe
tin
g E
xit
|Re
pla
ce
me
nt 
En
try
) −
 P
r(C
om
pe
tin
g E
xit
|Re
gu
lar
 En
try
)
1 5 10
First Difference (v.s. Regular Entry)
95% CI
−
0.
03
−
0.
02
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
Tenure
Pr
(C
om
pe
tin
g E
xit
|Re
pla
ce
me
nt 
En
try
) −
 P
r(C
om
pe
tin
g E
xit
|Re
org
an
iza
tio
n E
ntr
y)
1 5 10
First Difference (v.s. Reorganization Entry)
95% CI
Note: We show the change in predicted probabilities of coalition-competing removal when we change entry
manner from either regular (the left panel) or irregular reorganization (the right panel) to irregular replacement.
We use Model 1 in Table 4 to estimate the first difference.
either leaders who enter through regular (the left panel) or irregular reorganizations (the right
panel) early in their tenure. This advantage, however, gradually wanes and irregular replace-
ment entry stops having a significantly negative effect after approximately 9 (v.s. regular entry)
or 8 (v.s. irregular reorganization entry) years in power. This is congruent with our expectation
that the way a leader entered office should become less relevant the longer the leader stays in
power. Regarding the control variables, the results of the first column in Table 4 corroborate
previous research that finds these kinds of threats to be less likely when states enjoy greater
economic prosperity, more success in foreign armed conflicts, and either party-based or monar-
chical political institutions (Debs and Goemans, 2010; Magaloni, 2008; Kokkonen and Sundell,
2014; Londregan and Poole, 1990).
The method of leader entry does not have a similar effect on irregular removal by coali-
tion circumvention (assassinations and overthrows) and coalition collapse (internal reshuffles
and legal removals), as evinced by the statistically insignificant effects provided in the sec-
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ond and third columns in Table 4. The first differences reported in Figure 2 also confirm this
point.13 Leaders coming to power via irregular regime replacement are no less likely to suffer
removal by coalition circumvention (the top row) or collapse (the bottom row) than leaders
coming to power via regular processes (the left panel) or irregular reorganizations (the right
panel). Though the difference of the risk of coalition-collapsing exit between irregular regime
replacement and irregular reorganization entry is statistically significant after 3 years in power
(see the bottom-right panel), the effect of irregular replacement entry is insignificant at the very
beginning of a leader’s tenure when the value of the information provided by a leader’s entry
should be the strongest. These results thus show that the insulating effects of leader entry by
complete regime replacement are limited to coalition-competing forms of removal, and this is
congruent with our expectations (H2). Assassins, foreign powers, and internal factions are not
deterred by leaders who force their way into office with a credible show-of-strength. Instead,
leaders who prove strength through irregular regime replacement are only insulated from extra-
coalition threats that would require rivals to compete with and overcome the leader’s strong
coalition.
Our initial test collapsed many forms of leader entry into four theoretically-relevant cate-
gories: regular entry, irregular regime replacement, irregular regime reorganization, and foreign
installation. However, there could be important variation within these broader categories. Ta-
ble 5 presents two models in which we disaggregate these entry types to examine whether our
findings are driven by anomalous results for a more specific means of taking power. Most
importantly, we separate irregular replacements into two groups: regime-changing coups and
successful protests/rebellions. Model 2 shows the effects of these specific entry types relative to
regular forms of entry. Model 3 does the same but uses forms of irregular regime reorganization
as the base category for comparison.14
13The first differences in Figure 2 are calculated as the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition circum-
vention removal or coalition collapse removal when we change entry manner from either regular or irregular
reorganization to irregular regime replacement. We use Model 1 in Table 4 for the estimation.
14Due to the extremely low number of leaders entering through successful protests, it is not feasible for us to
further disaggregate this category.
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Figure 2: Effect of Irregular Replacement Entry on Coalition-Circumventing and Collapsing
Removal
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Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition circumvention removal (the top panel) and
coalition collapse removal (the bottom panel) when we change entry manner from either regular (the left panel)
or irregular reorganization (the right panel) to irregular regime replacement. We use Model 1 in Table 4 to
estimate the first difference.
The results of these tests provide very strong justification for categorizing these entry
types according to the strength they convey to potential challengers. Beginning with the results
for coalition-competing removal, we see very similar results for the two disaggregated forms of
irregular regime replacement, and importantly, coalition-competing challenges are least likely
to occur against leaders who took power in these ways. There is no meaningful difference
between leaders entering through successful rebellions or protests and those entering through
major regime-changing coups (the respective coefficients are -2.14 and -1.84 in Model 2, -2.80
and -2.52 in Model 3). In Figure 3, we chart the near-identical effects of these two forms of
irregular regime replacement on coalition-competing leader removal.
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Table 5: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships
Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable Coalition Coalition Coalition Voluntary Natural Coalition Coalition Coalition Voluntary Natural
Exit Manner Competing Circumventing Collapsing Resignation Death Competing Circumventing Collapsing Resignation Death
Base Category
Entry Manner Regular Entry Irregular Reorganization Entry
Irregular Replacement Entry
Rebel Entry -2.135*** -.319 -2.288* 1.837** 2.495** -2.797*** -2.421** -2.410** 1.223 2.406**
( .646) (1.422) (1.227 ) ( .763 ) ( 1.037) ( .576) ( 1.174) (1.210) ( .798 ) ( 1.173)
Rebel × log(Tenure) .470 .038 1.100*** -1.262** -.423 .727* .584 .312 -.988* -.428
( .388) ( .634 ) ( .353 ) ( .564) ( .479 ) ( .416 ) (.673) ( .347) ( .579) ( .497)
Regime-Change Coup Entry -1.836** 2.511* -.193 -.376 -.165 -2.524*** .159 -.221 -1.054** -.073
( .782) ( 1.395 ) ( .455 ) ( .577) (1.683) ( .613) ( 1.081 ) ( .535) (.517) (1.515)
Regime-Change Coup × log(Tenure) .518* -1.120 .329 -.138 -.429 .774*** -.446 -.470 .122 -.482
( .291) ( .692 ) ( .273 ) ( .244) ( .650) ( .296 ) ( .766 ) ( .312 ) (.284) ( .626)
Irregular Reorganization Entry
Reshuffling Coup Entry .131 1.844 .134 .816** -.469
( .833 ) ( 1.296 ) (.557) ( .378) ( 1.371)
Reshuffling Coup × log(Tenure) .158 -.054 .632** -.425* .064
( .369) (.629) ( .314 ) ( .258 ) ( .515)
Forced Selection Entry 1.462** 3.594*** -.205 .463 .408
( .706) ( 1.296) ( .512) ( .459) (1.381)
Forced Selection × log(Tenure) -1.194* -20.681*** 1.148*** -.094 -.008
( .676 ) ( 1.466) ( .300) ( .313 ) ( .482)
Regular Entry
Regular First-Election Entry -.594 -1.654 .172 -.321 -.670
( .727) (1.221 ) ( .529) ( .409) ( 2.178)
Regular First-Election × log(Tenure) .153 .305 -1.071*** -.015 .189
( .356 ) (.714 ) (.308) ( .250) ( .762)
Regular Election Entry -.916 -3.021 -.320 -.839** .437
( .764 ) ( 2.132) ( .469) (.368) ( 1.099)
Regular Election × log(Tenure) .452 .966 -.509* .520** -.186
( .411) ( 1.019) (.303) ( .248) ( .392)
Foreign Entry -1.120 1.887 -16.387*** -2.397 -13.576*** -1.880 -.564 -14.837*** -3.070 -11.955***
( 1.686) ( 1.362) ( .760) ( 2.223) ( 1.509) ( 1.757) ( .837) ( .816) (2.168 ) ( 1.420)
Foreign × log(Tenure) .847 -.028 1.154*** .714 -.715 1.137 .613 .361 1.037* -.750
( .829) ( .744 ) ( .402) ( .643) ( .503 ) ( .876) (.662 ) ( .415) ( .620 ) ( .519)
Log(Tenure) .125 .299 -.866*** -.069 .459 -.141 -.362 -.083 -.337* .504
( .192) ( .473) (.191 ) ( .129 ) ( .326) ( .265) ( .576) ( .197) ( .192) ( .317)
Controls
ln(GDP/capita) -.354** -.014 -.204 .122 -.325 -.372*** .022 -.224* .070 -.369
( .138 ) ( .159) ( .127 ) ( .139) ( .219) ( .135) ( .163) ( .130 ) ( .141) ( .226)
GDP Growth -3.064*** -1.291 -.153 -.522 -.005 -3.176*** -1.556 -.152 -.504 -.013
( .850) ( 1.755 ) ( .633) ( .775 ) (.181) ( .866 ) ( 1.733) ( .584 ) ( .770) ( .194)
Military Dictatorship -.147 .032 .688* .730*** .745* -.116 -.007 .609* .818*** .689
( .399) ( .661 ) ( .351 ) ( .257 ) ( .431) ( .327 ) ( .603) (.361) (.249) ( .510 )
Monarchy -2.176*** -.616 -.287 -.800 1.435** -2.078*** -.503 -.360 -.832 1.527**
( .815 ) ( .623 ) ( .585) (.595) ( .671) ( .792) ( .579) ( .581 ) ( .549) ( .735)
Party -2.108*** -.444 -.688* .993** -.604 -2.042*** -.334 -.684** .925** -.528
( .409) ( .572) ( .351) ( .427 ) ( .751) ( .417 ) ( .566) ( .332) ( .395) -.528 ( .835)
Ln(Military Personnel) -.152 .085 -.078 .046 .116 -.178* .055 -.080 .006 .109
( .095) ( .154) ( .076) ( .062 ) ( .131 ) ( .096 ) ( .156 ) (.077 ) ( .062) ( .149)
Civil War 1.857*** .999** .425 .215 -.716 1.867*** .951** .425 .244 -.691
( .272) (.473) (.347 ) (.232 ) ( .536 ) ( .275) ( .483) ( .350) ( .232) ( .539 )
War Victory -2.311* -7.464** -6.110 -2.456 1.080* -2.359* -7.292** -5.213 -2.174 1.153**
( 1.219 ) ( 3.261) ( 4.083 ) ( 1.539) ( .619) ( 1.206) ( 3.162) ( 3.701) ( 1.330) (.577)
War Defeat 1.011** 3.608*** .491 -.178 .679 .943* 3.310*** .656 -.108 .757
( .482 ) ( .647 ) ( .733) ( .675) (.568) (.515) ( .626) ( .730) ( .660) (.528)
War Draw -.539 -1.625 -.787 -.801 .463 -.538 -1.330 -.800 -.806 .445
( .496) ( 1.241 ) (.626 ) ( .651) ( .605) ( .483 ) ( 1.100) (.640) ( .659) ( .626)
Age .039*** .049** .022** .045*** .067*** .041*** .048** .024** .049*** .068***
(.013) ( .024 ) ( .010) ( .010 ) ( .014 ) ( .013) ( .022) ( .011) ( .011) ( .014)
Constant -1.716* -8.879*** -2.148** -7.600*** -7.795*** -.969 -6.596*** -2.025* -6.702*** -7.637***
( .947) (1.942) ( .988) ( 1.118) ( 1.608 ) (1.002) ( 1.659 ) ( 1.081) ( .994) ( 1.662)
Log Likelihood -1441.7293 -1445.123
Observations 3613 3613
Note: Robust country-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
We provide the first differences predicted from these models in Figure 2 and Table 7.
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Figure 3: Effect of Rebel and Regime-Change Coup Entry on Coalition-Competing Removal
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Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition-competing removal when we change entry
manner from regular or irregular reorganization entry to rebel or regime-change coup entry. We use Models 2 and
3 in Table 5 to estimate these first differences.
Figure 3 shows the changes in predicted probabilities of coalition-competing removal
when we change entry manner from regular (the top panel) or irregular reorganization (the
bottom panel) to rebel (the left panel) or regime-changing coup (the right panel). The effects
of rebel entry and regime-changing coup entry look very similar and, as predicted by our first
hypothesis, they are negative and significant during the first few years of a new leader’s time in
power. In other words, the coalition-competing removals are least likely to occur against leaders
who took power through successful rebellions or major regime-changing coups. These stabi-
lizing effects of the disaggregated forms of irregular regime replacement entry, though, grad-
ually diminish and leader entry has no statistically significant effect on the risk of a coalition-
competing exit once a leader has spent approximately 6-8 years in office.
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The results for the two forms of regular entry are also statistically indistinguishable from
each other (coefficients of -.59 and .-92 in Model 3). There is a larger difference between the
two forms of regime reorganization, but this is not surprising. Leaders entering through forced
election/selection (coefficient of 1.46, Model 2) have a greater risk of a coalition-competing
removal than those entering through a reshuffling coup (coefficient of 0.13, Model 2) because
reshuffles are responses to internal divisions while forced election/selection typically occurs
when regimes are already threatened by burgeoning popular protests or insurgencies. Since
many of these forced selections are desperate attempts to stave off an impending crisis, the
very high risk of a subsequent coalition-competing challenge is to be expected.
The results also show that most leaders who enter through irregular regime replacement
generally do not enjoy a similarly low risk of removal by coalition collapse or coalition cir-
cumvention. Leaders rising through rebellion are slightly less likely to suffer coalition collapse
in their first year in power, though the statistical significance of this effect is relatively weak
and derived from a small sample of leaders. Leaders entering through regime-changing coups
are somewhat more likely than regular entry leaders to suffer coalition-circumventing forms of
removal early in their tenures, but there is no similar effect vis-à-vis leaders who came to power
through irregular reorganizations.
Coup Entry and Coup Exit
Our findings seemingly challenge the well-known “coup trap” hypothesis, which is the idea
that a coup greatly increases the chances of a subsequent coup attempt (Londregan and Poole,
1990; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Powell, 2012). This argument implies that leaders who enter
office via coup are more likely to be removed via coup. In contrast, our analysis shows that
leaders who come to power by a regime-changing coup are significantly less likely to fall in
another regime-changing coup, especially in the first few years after they take power. Here, we
show that we can reconcile these complementary findings.
Table 6 present the results from four slightly different logit models. Models 4 and 5
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Table 6: Logit Analysis of Coup Exit in Dictatorships
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Dependent Variable:
Exit Manner Regime-Change Coup Reshuffling-Coup
Base Category:
Entry Manner Non-Coup
Independent Variables
Regime-Change Coup Entry -2.375** -1.767** -.065 .099
( .924) ( .792) ( .556 ) (.416)
Regime-Change Coup × log(Tenure) .394 .150
( .406) (.308 )
Reshuffling Coup Entry -.082 .186 .275 .795**
( .785) ( .609) (.505) ( .363)
Reshuffling Coup × log(Tenure) .215 .478
( .389) (.293)
Log(Tenure) .178 .265 -.576*** -.417***
( .220) ( .194) ( .174 ) (.115)
Controls
ln(GDP/capita) -.509*** -.520*** -.225 -.207
( .188) ( .190) ( .151) (.158 )
GDP Growth -.319 -.372 -.365 -.365
( 1.088) ( 1.129) ( .852) (.953)
Military Dictatorship -.169 -.110 .612 .675*
( .530) (.529) ( .388 ) ( .393)
Monarchy -2.443*** -2.429*** -.240 -.205
( .832) ( .829 ) ( .635) (.630)
Party -2.866*** -2.860*** -.823** -.803**
( .479) ( .488) ( .389) ( .373 )
Ln(Military Personnel) -.223* -.220* -.073 -.075
( .126 ) ( .126) (.088) ( .087 )
Civil War 1.537*** 1.544*** .483 .474
( .387) ( .386) ( .333 ) ( .327)
War Victory -2.124 -2.196 -4.991 -4.943
( 1.536) ( 1.540) ( 4.808) ( 4.600)
War Defeat .065 .181 .111 .091
( .972) (.905 ) ( 1.017) ( 1.013)
War Draw -2.139** -2.107** -1.199 -1.196
(1.012) ( 1.011) (.769) ( .777)
Age .040** .040** .018 .017
( .019) (.018) ( .011) (.011 )
Constant -.613 -.728 -2.239** -2.538**
( 1.247) ( 1.234) (1.081) (1.105)
Log Likelihood -189.0286 -189.41068 -271.83226 -272.8182
Observations 3613 3613 3613 3613
Parentheses contain robust country-clustered errors. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
examine whether leaders entering through regime-changing and reshuffling coups face different
risks of being overthrown in a regime-changing coup. Models 6 and 7 instead examine the
effects of two types of coup entry on the risk of being overthrown in a reshuffling coup. To
evaluate the substantive effect of each type of coup entry, we also calculate the first difference
of the risk of being ousted via each type of coup when we change entry manner from non-coup
entry to either regime-changing coup or reshuffling coup entry in Figures 4 and 5.
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The results in Table 6 show leaders who enter in a regime-changing coup are excep-
tionally unlikely to lose power in a regime-changing coup; the coefficients on Regime-Change
Coup Entry (Models 4 and 5) are negative and significant. We illustrate this result in Figure
4). Meanwhile, leaders who enter in reshuffling coups are neither more nor less likely to suffer
a regime-changing coup relative to leaders who entered in other ways (right panel of Figure
4. This finding rebukes the established wisdom regarding coup traps, at least as it applies to
regime-changing coups.
Figure 4: Effect of Different Types of Coup Entry on Regime-Change Coup Exit
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Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of regime-change coup removal when we change entry
manner from non- coup entry to regime-change coup or reshuffling-coup entry. We use Models 4 in Table 6 to
estimate the first difference.
But the same is not true of reshuffling coups (Models 6 and 7). Here, we see that while
leaders entering in regime-changing coups are no more likely to fall in a reshuffling coup than
leaders entering in a non-coup manner (See Figure 5, left), leaders who come to power in
reshuffling coups are significantly more likely to suffer this type of threat (See Figure 5, right).
Though the effect of reshuffling coup entry is insignificant in the first two years of leader
tenure, it becomes positive and significant for the remainder of a leader’s time in power (Figure
5, right).
27
Taken together, the results reported in this section reveal that while regime-changing
coups deter subsequent regime-changing coups as our theory predicts, reshuffling coups en-
courage subsequent reshuffling coups. In accordance with prior literature, leaders who come
to power via a reshuffling coup are significantly more likely to be overthrown via a reshuffling
coup. By disaggregating coups by type, we find that the coup trap is the result of successive
waves of reshuffling coups. Our argument is thus consistent with the coup trap argument; lead-
ers who enter in major regime-changing coups are much less likely to be overthrown, yet the
“coup trap” greatly increases the chances that leaders rising in reshuffling coups will be targeted
by subsequent reshuffling coups.
Figure 5: Effect of Different Types of Coup Entry on Reshuffling Coup Exit
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
Tenure
Pr
(R
eg
−C
ha
ng
e E
xit
|Re
g−
Ch
an
ge
 En
try
)− 
Pr
(R
eg
−C
ha
ng
e E
xit
|No
n−
Co
up
 En
try
)
1 5 10
Effect of Regime−Change Coup Entry (v.s. Non−Coup Entry)
95 % CI
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
Tenure
Pr
(R
eg
−C
ha
ng
e E
xit
|Re
sh
uff
ling
 En
try
)− 
Pr
(R
eg
−C
ha
ng
e E
xit
|No
n C
ou
p E
ntr
y)
1 5 10
Effect of Reshuffling Coup Entry (v.s. Non−Coup Entry)
95 % CI
Note: We show the changes in predicted probabilities of reshuffling coup removal when we change entry manner
from non- coup entry to regime-change coup or reshuffling-coup entry (Model 6, Table 6).
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The Rise Predicts the Fall
About 60% of the non-democratic leaders who come to power via coup, civil war, or protest
are still in power three years later, and this rate is not significantly different than that for non-
democratic leaders who were elected or selected in regular constitutional processes. Yet, this
similarity obscures an important difference: leaders with regular entries are more likely to
be removed by rival coalitions while those who took power by removing their predecessor’s
entire governments were more likely to voluntarily resign. This provides some support for
Machiavelli’s observation that those who overcome the greatest difficulty in coming to power
are those who have the least trouble keeping it. We show that this classical insight is consistent
with the modern literatures on coordination and signaling; leaders who convey the strength of
their supporting coalitions at the dawn of their tenures prove to be more resilient against similar
challenges once in power.
Our analysis shows that after controlling for relevant political and economic factors, lead-
ers who rise to power by coup, civil war, or protest are several times less likely to suffer these
kinds of irregular regime changes compared to non-democratic leaders who came to power by
other means. We claim the relative invulnerability enjoyed by these leaders is attributable to
the show-of-strength that occurs when a new leader takes office with the explicit support of a
strong, loyal, and risk-acceptant coalition of supporters. This demonstration of support helps
leaders deter potential threats more effectively than leaders who came to power in ways that do
not convey a strong coalition.
Beyond our core finding linking coordinated irregular entry to a lower risk of similar
types of leader removal, the paper highlights what we can learn by looking beyond the con-
stitutionality of non-democratic leader transitions and focusing more on the causes and con-
sequences of specific forms of transition. We show that some forms of entry more explicitly
convey the level of support a new incumbent enjoys, and we have also shown that some types
of challenges are more sensitive to this kind of information. These insights should allow for
more accurate predictions of war and coup in at-risk states, and they should also improve our
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understanding of how dictators choose to placate or repress political opposition. Future work
could continue to refine this argument and consider factors that were not included in this study,
such as how ethnic cleavages or the level of violence in a previous transition might affect subse-
quent political stability. If some entry types deter challenges, then leader entry could also affect
levels of repression and concessions including public goods provision and political reform.
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Supporting Appendix A: Our Dataset and Coding Criteria
1
This dataset codes eight forms of leader entry according to the following coding tree:
1. Did the ruling political regime choose the new leader or agree to the process for leader selection?
YES 1a. Was this decision a response to an unexpected political crisis brought on by regime opponents,
such as an assassination, protest, or war?
YES Code as Forced Election/Selection. Leaders here should include those entering after assassina-
tions, those appointed by the regime in response to protests, etc. but should not include leaders
that were not explicitly chosen by the predecessor or the appropriate officials within the prede-
cessor’s ruling regime.
NO 1b. Was this the first transition between individual leaders within the predecessor’s regime (un-
precedented), or was the predecessor the most recent of multiple leaders to have served under
the existing ruling order (unprecedented)?
PRECEDENTED Code as Regular Election/Selection. Leaders here should include those were
(s)elected under long-established dominant party systems, successors in established heredi-
tary monarchies, etc. This code should not be applied to leaders who took power in systems
that did not have established patterns/norms of leader transition.
UNPRECEDENTED Code as First Regular Transition. This category encompasses the leaders
who come to power within a regime that has not yet established precedented patterns for
leader transition. The first leaders to succeed regime founders (e.g. Raul Castro) or those who
come to power in a regime’s first elections (e.g. Francois Duvalier) belong in this category.
NO 2. The new leader was forced upon the predecessor’s government by:
A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT Code as Foreign Installation. Leaders belong in this category if foreign
governments were the most important actors in the leader transition. Foreign support for rebel
groups or coup plotters is not sufficient. Typically, the foreign role will be much greater in these
cases (e.g. Castillo Armas in Guatemala, 1957 or Harmid Karzai in Afghanistan, 2001).
COUP CONSPIRATORS 2a. Did the coup plotters seek to replace the leader while mostly preserving
existing regime norms and institutions?
YES Code as Reshuffle Coup. Sometimes called “shuffling coups,” these are transitions in which
conspirators put a new individual in charge of the existing order. These are less likely to
bloody coups.
NO Code as Regime-Change Coup. These transitions occur when entire political regimes are
removed and replaced. In addition to leader replacement, the successful coup plotters signif-
icantly change institutions and the nature of executive power in the country.
A MASS MOVEMENT 2b. Did the movement achieve a military victory over the government?
YES Code as Successful Rebellion. This category should include only leaders who were chosen
by successful rebels after a military campaign against the government. Leaders chosen by
the ruling regime in response to an increasingly threatening rebellion should be coded as
Irregular Election/Selection because the predecessor’s government selected the new leader.
NO Code as Successful Protest. This category should include only leaders who were chosen
by successful protesters/strikers after a non-militarized campaign against the government.
Leaders chosen by the ruling regime in response to an increasingly threatening protest should
be coded as Irregular Election/Selection because the predecessor’s government selected the
new leader.
2
This dataset codes eight forms of leader exit according to the following coding tree:
1. Did the leader die a natural death in office?
YES Code as Natural Death.
NO See Question 2.
2 Was the leader assassinated outside the context of a larger coup conspiracy or political conflict?
YES Code as Assassination. Note that killings that occur as a result of bloody coups or rebel victories
should be coded elsewhere.
NO See Question 3.
3. Was the leader forced out by an immediate political crisis, or did the leader resign voluntarily?
RESIGNED Code as Voluntary Resignation. These usually occur with elections, successions, and abdica-
tions that are not immediate responses to major political crises.
FORCED 4. The leader was forced out primarily by:
A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT Code as Foreign Overthrow. Leaders belong in this category if foreign
governments were the most important actors in the leader transition. Foreign support for rebel
groups or coup plotters is not sufficient. Typically, the foreign role will be much greater in these
cases (e.g. Hussein in Iraq, 2003).
COUP CONSPIRATORS 4a. Did the coup plotters seek to replace the leader while mostly preserving
existing regime norms and institutions?
YES Code as Reshuffle Coup. Sometimes called “shuffling coups,” these are transitions in which
conspirators put a new individual in charge of the existing order. These are less likely to be
bloody coups.
NO Code as Regime-Change Coup. These transitions occur when entire political regimes are
removed and replaced. In addition to leader replacement, the successful coup plotters signif-
icantly change institutions and the nature of executive power in the country.
A MASS MOVEMENT 4b. Did the movement coerce the government through military force?
YES Code as Rebellion. This category should include only leaders who were forced out during a
rebel campaign against the government.
NO Code as Protest. This category should include only leaders who were forced out by protesters/strikers
after a non-militarized campaign against the government.
A LEGAL PROCESS Code as Legal Removal. Constitutional impeachments, involuntary removals by
juntas or politburos (via legal deliberations rather than secretive coups), etc. qualify here. For
these to not be counted as Voluntary Resignations, there needs to be strong evidence that the
leader was removed by an unusual and legal process (i.e. not a Leader Coup) against her wishes.
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leadercode ccode smonth syear leader emonth eyear entry exit archigosentry archigosexit puppet
40001 40 3 1952 Batista 1 1959 Regime-Change Coup Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
40002 40 1 1959 Castro 2 2008 Successful Rebellion Resignation, Health Irregular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
40003 40 2 2008 Raul Castro First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
41001 41 5 1950 Magloire 12 1956 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
41002 41 12 1956 Pierre-Louis 2 1957 Reshuffle Coup Protest Regular Military Coup 0
41003 41 2 1957 Sylvain 4 1957 Forced Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
41004 41 4 1957 Executive Council 5 1957 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Regular Regular 0
41005 41 5 1957 Cantave 5 1957 Reshuffle Coup Protest Irregular Military Coup 1
41006 41 5 1957 Fignole 6 1957 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
41007 41 6 1957 Kebreau 10 1957 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
41008 41 10 1957 Duvalier, Francois 4 1971 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
41009 41 4 1971 Duvalier, Jean- 2 1986 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
41010 41 2 1986 Namphy 2 1988 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
41011 41 2 1988 Manigat 6 1988 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
41012 41 6 1988 Namphy 9 1988 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
41013 41 9 1988 Avril 3 1990 Regime-Change Coup Protest Irregular Protest 0
41014 41 3 1990 Pascal-Troillet 2 1991 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
41015 41 9 1991 Cedras 10 1994 Regime-Change Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
41016 41 2 2001 Aristide 2 2004 First Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
41017 41 2 2004 Boniface Alexandre 5 2006 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
42001 42 5 1961 Balaguer 1 1962 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 1
42002 42 1 1962 Filiberto Bonnelly 2 1963 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
42003 42 9 1963 de los Santos 12 1963 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
42004 42 12 1963 Cabral 4 1965 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 1
42005 42 4 1965 Bartolome Benoit 5 1965 Regime-Change Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Regular 0
42006 42 5 1965 Imbert 8 1965 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
42007 42 9 1965 Godoy 7 1966 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
42008 42 7 1966 Balaguer 7 1978 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
55001 55 3 1979 Maurice Bishop 10 1983 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup NA NA 0
55002 55 10 1983 Hudson Austin 10 1983 Reshuffle Coup Foreign Overthrow NA NA 0
55003 55 12 1983 Nicholas Brathwaite 12 1984 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70001 70 12 1952 Ruiz Cortines 12 1958 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70002 70 12 1958 Lopez Mateos 12 1964 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70003 70 12 1964 Diaz Ordaz 12 1970 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70004 70 12 1970 Echeverria Alvarez 12 1976 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70005 70 12 1976 Lopez Portillo 12 1982 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70006 70 12 1982 de La Madrid 12 1988 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70007 70 12 1988 Salinas 11 1994 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
70008 70 12 1994 Zedillo 11 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
90001 90 6 1954 Monzon 7 1954 Regime-Change Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
90002 90 7 1954 Castillo Armas 7 1957 Foreign Installation Assassination Irregular Assassination by Unsupported Individual 0
90003 90 7 1957 Gonzalez Lopez 10 1957 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
90004 90 10 1957 Flores Avendano 3 1958 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
90005 90 3 1958 Ydigoras Fuente 3 1963 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
90006 90 3 1963 Peralta Azurdia 7 1966 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
90007 90 7 1966 Mendez Montenegro 7 1970 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
90008 90 7 1970 Arana Osorio 7 1974 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
90009 90 7 1974 Laugerud Garcia 7 1978 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
90010 90 7 1978 Lucas Garcia 3 1982 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
90011 90 3 1982 Rios Montt 8 1983 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
90012 90 8 1983 Mejia Victores 1 1986 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
90013 90 1 1986 Cerezo 1 1991 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
90014 90 1 1991 Serrano Elias 5 1993 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
90015 90 6 1993 Leon Carpio 1 1996 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
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91001 91 11 1954 Lozano Diaz 10 1956 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
91002 91 10 1956 Hector Caraccioli 12 1957 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
91003 91 10 1963 Lopez Arellano 6 1971 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
91004 91 12 1972 Lopez Arellano 4 1975 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
91005 91 4 1975 Melgar Castro 8 1978 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
91006 91 8 1978 Paz Garcia 1 1982 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
92001 92 9 1950 Osorio 9 1956 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
92002 92 9 1956 Lemus 10 1960 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
92003 92 10 1960 Castillo 1 1961 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
92004 92 1 1961 Portillo 1 1962 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
92005 92 1 1962 Rodolfo Cordon 7 1962 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
92006 92 7 1962 Rivera 7 1967 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
92007 92 7 1967 Sanchez Hernandez 7 1972 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
92008 92 7 1972 Molina 7 1977 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
92009 92 7 1977 Romero Mena 10 1979 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
92010 92 10 1979 Majano Ramos 12 1980 Reshuffle Coup Legal Removal Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
92011 92 12 1980 Duarte 5 1982 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
92012 92 5 1982 Magana Borjo 6 1984 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
93001 93 9 1956 Luis Somoza Debayle 5 1963 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
93002 93 5 1963 Shick Gutierrez 8 1966 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 1
93003 93 8 1966 Guerrero Gutierrez 5 1967 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
93004 93 5 1967 Anastasio Somoza Debayle 7 1979 Regular Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
93005 93 7 1979 Daniel Ortega 4 1990 Successful Rebellion Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
95001 95 5 1951 Arosomena, A. 10 1952 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
95002 95 10 1952 Remon Cantero 1 1955 Regular Election/Selection Assassination Regular Assassination by Unsupported Individual 0
95003 95 1 1955 Guizado 1 1955 Forced Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Regular 0
95004 95 1 1955 Arias Espinosa 10 1956 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
95005 95 10 1956 Guardia Jr., E. 10 1960 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
95006 95 10 1968 Torrijos Herrera 7 1981 Regime-Change Coup Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
95007 95 7 1981 Florez Aguilar 3 1982 Forced Election/Selection Legal Removal Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
95008 95 3 1982 Dario Paredes 8 1983 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
95009 95 8 1983 Noriega 1 1990 First Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
100001 100 8 1950 Laureanco Gomez 11 1951 Regular Election/Selection Resignation, Health Regular Regular 0
100002 100 11 1951 Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez 6 1953 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
100003 100 6 1953 Rojas Pinillia 5 1957 Reshuffle Coup Protest Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
100004 100 5 1957 Paris 8 1958 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
101001 101 11 1950 Perez Jimenez 1 1958 Forced Election/Selection Protest Irregular Protest 0
101002 101 3 2013 Nicolas Maduro First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
110001 110 5 1966 Burnham 8 1985 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
110002 110 8 1985 Hoyte 10 1992 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
115001 115 11 1975 Ferrier 2 1980 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
115002 115 2 1980 Bouterse 1 1988 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
115003 115 12 1990 Kraag 9 1991 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
130001 130 7 1963 Castro 3 1966 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Protest 1
130002 130 3 1966 Yerovi Indaburu 11 1966 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
130003 130 11 1966 Arosemena Gomez 9 1968 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
130004 130 2 1972 Rodriguez Lara 1 1976 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
130005 130 1 1976 Poveda Burbano 8 1979 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
135001 135 6 1950 Noriega 7 1950 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
135002 135 7 1950 Odria 7 1956 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
135003 135 7 1962 Perez Godoy 3 1963 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
135004 135 3 1963 Lindley Lopez 7 1963 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
135005 135 10 1968 Velasco Alvarado 8 1975 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
135006 135 8 1975 Morales Bermudez 7 1980 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
135007 135 11 2000 Valentin Paniagua 7 2001 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
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140001 140 4 1964 Castello Branco 3 1967 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
140002 140 3 1967 Costa de Silva 9 1969 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
140003 140 9 1969 Military Junta 10 1969 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
140004 140 10 1969 Medici 3 1974 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
140005 140 3 1974 Geisel 3 1979 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
140006 140 3 1979 Figueiredo 3 1985 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
145001 145 5 1951 Ballivian Rojas 4 1952 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Rebellion 0
145002 145 4 1952 Paz Estenssoro 6 1956 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
145003 145 6 1956 Siles Zuazo 8 1960 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
145004 145 8 1960 Paz Estenssoro 11 1964 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
145005 145 11 1964 Barrientos Ortuna 1 1966 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
145006 145 1 1966 Ovando Candia 8 1966 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
145007 145 8 1966 Barrientos Ortuna 4 1969 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
145008 145 4 1969 Siles Salinas 9 1969 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
145009 145 9 1969 Ovando Candia 10 1970 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
145010 145 10 1970 Torres 8 1971 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
145011 145 8 1971 Banzer Suarez 7 1978 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
145012 145 7 1978 Pereda Asbun 11 1978 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
145013 145 11 1978 Padilla Aranciba 8 1979 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
145014 145 8 1979 Guevara Arze 11 1979 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
145015 145 11 1979 Natusch Busch 11 1979 Regime-Change Coup Protest Irregular Regular 0
145016 145 11 1979 Gueiler Tejada 7 1980 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
145017 145 7 1980 Garcia Meza Tejada 8 1981 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
145018 145 8 1981 Torrelio Villa 7 1982 Reshuffle Coup Legal Removal Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
145019 145 7 1982 Vildoso Calderon 10 1982 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
150001 150 5 1954 Pareira 7 1954 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
150002 150 7 1954 Stroessner 2 1989 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Military Coup 0
150003 150 2 1989 Rodriguez Pedotti 8 1993 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
155001 155 9 1973 Pinochet 3 1990 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
160001 160 9 1955 Lonardi 11 1955 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
160002 160 11 1955 Aramburu 5 1958 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
160003 160 5 1958 Frondizi 3 1962 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
160004 160 3 1962 Guido 10 1963 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
160005 160 10 1963 Arturo Illia 6 1966 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 1
160006 160 6 1966 Ongania 6 1970 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
160007 160 6 1970 Lanusse 6 1970 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
160008 160 6 1970 Levingston 3 1971 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
160009 160 3 1971 Lanusse 5 1973 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
160010 160 3 1976 Videla 3 1981 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
160011 160 3 1981 Viola 11 1981 First Election/Selection Resignation, Health Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
160012 160 11 1981 Liendo 12 1981 Regular Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Military Coup 0
160013 160 12 1981 Galtieri 6 1982 Forced Election/Selection Legal Removal Irregular Military Coup 0
160014 160 6 1982 Saint-Jean 7 1982 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
160015 160 7 1982 Bignone 12 1983 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
165001 165 6 1976 Demichelli 9 1976 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Military Coup 1
165002 165 9 1976 Mendez Manfredini 9 1981 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
165003 165 9 1981 Alvarez Armalino 3 1985 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
221001 221 4 2005 Albert Regular Election/Selection Still in Power NA NA 0
223001 223 11 1989 Hans-Adam II Regular Election/Selection Still in Power NA NA 0
230001 230 11 1975 Juan Carlos 11 1975 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
230002 230 11 1975 Arias Navarro 7 1976 Regular Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Regular 0
235001 235 9 1968 Caetano 4 1974 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
235002 235 4 1974 Spinola 9 1974 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
235003 235 9 1974 Costa Gomes 7 1976 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
265001 265 7 1950 Ulbricht 5 1971 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
6
265002 265 5 1971 Honecker 10 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
265003 265 10 1989 Krenz 12 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
265004 265 12 1989 Gysi 10 1990 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Foreign 0
290001 290 3 1956 Ochab 10 1956 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
290002 290 10 1956 Gomulka 12 1970 Regular Election/Selection Protest Regular Protest 0
290003 290 12 1970 Gierek 9 1980 Regular Election/Selection Protest Regular Natural Death 0
290004 290 9 1980 Kania 10 1981 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
290005 290 10 1981 Jaruzelski 12 1990 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
305001 305 4 1953 Raab 4 1961 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
310001 310 7 1956 Gero 10 1956 Forced Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Irregular Protest 0
310002 310 10 1956 Nagy 11 1956 Forced Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
310003 310 11 1956 Kadar 5 1988 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Foreign Regular 0
310004 310 5 1988 Grosz 10 1989 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
310005 310 10 1989 Szuros 5 1990 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
315001 315 3 1953 Zapotocky 11 1957 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Natural Death 0
315002 315 11 1957 Novotny 1 1968 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
315003 315 1 1968 Dubcek 8 1968 Regular Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Regular Foreign 0
315004 315 8 1968 Svoboda 8 1968 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Foreign 1
315005 315 8 1968 Husak 12 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Foreign Regular 0
339001 339 4 1985 Alia 4 1992 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
344001 344 5 1991 Tudjman 11 1999 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
344002 344 11 1999 Pavletic 2 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
344003 344 2 2000 Tomcic 2 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
344004 344 2 2000 Mesic 11 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345001 345 5 1980 Kolisevski 5 1980 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
345002 345 5 1980 Mijatovic 5 1981 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345003 345 5 1981 Kraigher 5 1982 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345004 345 5 1982 Stambolic 5 1983 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345005 345 5 1983 Spiljac 5 1984 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345006 345 5 1984 Djuranovic 5 1985 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345007 345 5 1985 Vlajkovic 5 1986 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345008 345 5 1986 Hasani 5 1987 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345009 345 5 1987 Mojsov 5 1988 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345010 345 5 1988 Dizarevic 5 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
345011 345 5 1989 Milosevic 10 2000 Regular Election/Selection Protest Regular Regular 0
346001 346 12 1990 Izetbegovic 10 1998 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346002 346 10 1998 Radisic 6 1999 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346003 346 6 1999 Jelavic 2 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346004 346 2 2000 Izetbegovic 10 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
346005 346 10 2000 Radisic 6 2001 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346006 346 6 2001 Krizanovic 2 2002 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346007 346 2 2002 Belkic 10 2002 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346008 346 10 2002 Sarovic 4 2003 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346009 346 4 2003 Borislav Paravac 6 2003 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
346010 346 6 2003 Dragan Covic 2 2004 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346011 346 2 2004 Sulejman Tihic 10 2004 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346012 346 10 2004 Borislav Paravac 6 2005 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346013 346 6 2005 Miro Jovic 2 2006 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346014 346 2 2006 Sulejman Tihic 11 2006 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346015 346 11 2006 Radmanovic 7 2007 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346016 346 7 2007 Zeljko Komsic 3 2008 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346017 346 3 2008 Silajdzic 11 2008 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346018 346 11 2008 Radmanovic 7 2009 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346019 346 7 2009 Zeljko Komsic 3 2010 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346020 346 3 2010 Silajdzic 11 2010 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
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346021 346 11 2010 Radmanovic 7 2011 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346022 346 7 2011 Zeljko Komsic 3 2012 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
346023 346 3 2012 Izetbegovic 11 2012 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
346024 346 11 2012 Radmanovic 7 2013 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
346025 346 7 2013 Komsic 3 2014 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346026 346 3 2014 Izetbegovic 11 2014 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346027 346 11 2014 Ivanic 7 2015 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
346028 346 7 2015 Covic 3 2016 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Still in Office 0
346029 346 3 2016 Izetbegovic Regular Election/Selection Still in Power NA NA 0
347001 347 2 2008 Thaci 12 2014 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
350001 350 4 1967 Kollias 12 1967 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Military Coup 0
350002 350 12 1967 Papadopoulos 11 1973 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
350003 350 11 1973 Ionannides 7 1974 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
352001 352 8 1960 Makarios 7 1974 First Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Regular Military Coup 0
352002 352 7 1974 Sampson 7 1974 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Irregular Irregular, Other 1
352003 352 7 1974 Clerides 12 1974 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
352004 352 12 1974 Makarios 8 1977 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
352005 352 8 1977 Kyprianou 2 1988 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
352006 352 2 1988 Vassiliou 2 1993 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
352007 352 2 1993 Clerides 2 2003 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
352008 352 2 2003 Tassos Nikolaou Papadopoulos 2 2008 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
352009 352 2 2008 Dimitris Christofias 2 2013 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
352010 352 2 2013 Nikos Anastasiadis Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
355001 355 2 1950 Chervenkov 4 1956 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
355002 355 4 1956 Zhivkov 11 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
355003 355 11 1989 Mladenov 7 1990 Regular Election/Selection Protest Regular Regular 0
355004 355 7 1990 Lukanov 12 1990 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
360001 360 3 1965 Ceausescu 12 1989 First Election/Selection Protest Irregular Protest 0
360002 360 12 1989 Roman 10 1991 Successful Protest Protest Regular Regular 0
365001 365 3 1953 Malenkov 3 1953 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
365002 365 3 1953 Khrushchev 10 1964 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
365003 365 10 1964 Brezhnev 11 1982 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
365004 365 11 1982 Andropov 2 1984 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
365005 365 2 1984 Chernenko 3 1985 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
365006 365 3 1985 Gorbachev 8 1991 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
365007 365 1 2000 Putin Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
370001 370 9 1991 Shushkevich 1 1994 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
370002 370 1 1994 Hryb 7 1994 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
370003 370 7 1994 Lukashenko Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
371001 371 10 1991 Ter-Petrosyan 2 1998 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
372001 372 4 1991 Gamsakhurdia 1 1992 First Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
372002 372 1 1992 Ioseliani 3 1992 Successful Rebellion Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
372003 372 3 1992 Shevardnadze 11 2003 First Election/Selection Protest Regular Protest 0
372004 372 11 2003 Burdjanadze 1 2004 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
373001 373 9 1991 Mutalibov 3 1992 First Election/Selection Protest Regular Regular 0
373002 373 3 1992 Mamedov 5 1992 Forced Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Regular 0
373003 373 6 1993 H. Aliyev 8 2003 Forced Election/Selection Resignation, Health Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
373004 373 8 2003 Ilhma Aliyev First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
402001 402 7 1975 Pires 4 1991 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
403001 403 6 1975 da Costa 3 1991 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
404001 404 9 1974 Cabral 11 1980 Successful Rebellion Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
404002 404 11 1980 Vieira 5 1999 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
404003 404 5 1999 Mane 5 1999 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
404004 404 5 1999 Sanha 2 2000 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
404005 404 9 2003 Henrique Pereira Rosa 10 2005 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
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404006 404 3 2009 Raimundo Perreira 9 2009 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
404007 404 9 2009 Sanha 1 2012 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
404008 404 1 2012 Pereira 4 2012 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
404009 404 4 2012 Kuruma 5 2012 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
404010 404 5 2012 Nhamadjo 6 2014 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
411001 411 8 1979 Nguema Mbasogo Reshuffle Coup Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
420001 420 2 1965 Jawara 7 1994 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
420002 420 7 1994 Jammeh Regime-Change Coup Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
432001 432 9 1960 Keita 11 1968 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
432002 432 11 1968 Traore 3 1991 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
432003 432 3 1991 Amadou Toure 6 1992 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
432004 432 3 2012 Sanogo 4 2012 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
432005 432 4 2012 Traore 9 2013 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
433001 433 8 1960 Senghor 12 1980 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
433002 433 1 1981 Diouf 4 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
434001 434 1 1960 Maga 10 1963 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
434002 434 10 1963 Soglo 1 1964 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
434003 434 1 1964 Apithy 11 1965 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
434004 434 11 1965 Congacou 12 1965 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 1
434005 434 12 1965 Soglo 12 1967 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
434006 434 12 1967 Alley 8 1968 Regime-Change Coup Legal Removal Irregular Regular 0
434007 434 8 1968 Zinsou 12 1969 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
434008 434 12 1969 Paul-Emile de Souza 5 1970 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
434009 434 5 1970 Maga 4 1972 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
434010 434 4 1972 Ahomadegbe 10 1972 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
434011 434 10 1972 Kerekou 4 1991 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
435001 435 11 1960 Ould Daddah 7 1978 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
435002 435 7 1978 Ould Mohamed Salek 4 1979 Regime-Change Coup Legal Removal Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
435003 435 4 1979 Ould Bouceif 5 1979 First Election/Selection Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
435004 435 6 1979 Ould Ahmed Louly 1 1980 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
435005 435 1 1980 Ould Haidalla 12 1984 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
435006 435 12 1984 Sidi Ahmed Taya 8 2005 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
435007 435 8 2005 Ould Mohamed Vall 4 2007 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
435008 435 8 2008 Ould Abdel Aziz 4 2009 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
435009 435 4 2009 dit M'Bare 8 2009 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
435010 435 8 2009 Ould Abdel Aziz Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
436001 436 10 1960 Diori 4 1974 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
436002 436 4 1974 Kountche 11 1987 Regime-Change Coup Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
436003 436 11 1987 Seibou 4 1993 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
436004 436 1 1996 Mainassara 4 1999 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
436005 436 4 1999 Wanke 12 1999 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
436006 436 2 2010 Djibo 4 2011 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
437001 437 8 1960 Houphouet-Boigny 12 1993 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
437002 437 12 1993 Konan Bedie 12 1999 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
437003 437 12 1999 Guei 10 2000 Regime-Change Coup Protest Irregular Protest 0
437004 437 10 2000 Laurent Gbagbo 4 2011 Forced Election/Selection Rebellion Irregular Military Coup 0
438001 438 10 1958 Toure 3 1984 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
438002 438 3 1984 Beavogui 4 1984 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
438003 438 4 1984 Conte 12 2008 Regime-Change Coup Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
438004 438 12 2008 Dadis Camara 12 2009 Regime-Change Coup Resignation, Health Irregular Military Coup 0
438005 438 12 2009 Sekouba Konate 12 2010 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
439001 439 8 1960 Yameogo 1 1966 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
439002 439 1 1966 Lamizana 11 1980 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
439003 439 11 1980 Zerbo 11 1982 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
439004 439 11 1982 J. P. Ouedraogo 8 1983 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
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439005 439 8 1983 Sankara 10 1987 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
439006 439 10 1987 Campaore 10 2014 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Regular 0
439007 439 11 2014 Zida 11 2014 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
439008 439 11 2014 Kafando 12 2015 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
450001 450 7 1971 Tolbert 4 1980 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
450002 450 4 1980 Doe 9 1990 Regime-Change Coup Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
450003 450 11 1990 Sawyer 3 1994 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Foreign Regular 0
450004 450 3 1994 Kpormapkor 9 1995 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
450005 450 9 1995 Sankawulo 9 1996 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
450006 450 9 1996 Perry 8 1997 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
450007 450 8 1997 Taylor 8 2003 Regular Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Regular 0
450008 450 8 2003 Moses Zeh Blah 10 2003 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
450009 450 10 2003 Bryant 1 2006 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
451001 451 3 1967 Juxon-Smith 4 1968 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
451002 451 4 1968 Stevens 11 1985 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
451003 451 11 1985 Momoh 4 1992 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
451004 451 5 1992 Strasser 1 1996 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
451005 451 1 1996 Bio 3 1996 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
451006 451 5 1997 Koroma 2 1998 Regime-Change Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
452001 452 2 1966 Ankrah 4 1969 Regime-Change Coup Legal Removal Irregular Regular 0
452002 452 4 1969 Afrifa 9 1969 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
452003 452 9 1969 Busia 1 1972 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
452004 452 1 1972 Acheampong 7 1978 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
452005 452 7 1978 Akuffo 6 1979 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
452006 452 6 1979 Rawlings 9 1979 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
452007 452 12 1981 Rawlings 1 2001 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
461001 461 1 1963 Grunitzky 1 1967 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
461002 461 1 1967 Dadjo 4 1967 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 1
461003 461 4 1967 Eyadema 2 2005 First Election/Selection Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
461004 461 2 2005 Faure Gnassingbe 2 2005 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
461005 461 2 2005 Bonfoh 5 2005 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
461006 461 5 2005 Faure Gnassingbe Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
471001 471 1 1960 Ahidjo 11 1982 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
471002 471 11 1982 Biya Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
475001 475 1 1966 Ironsi 7 1966 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
475002 475 7 1966 Gowon 7 1975 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
475003 475 7 1975 Ramat Mohammed 2 1976 Reshuffle Coup Assassination Irregular Military Coup 0
475004 475 2 1976 Obasanjo 10 1979 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
475005 475 12 1983 Buhari 8 1985 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
475006 475 8 1985 Babangida 8 1993 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
475007 475 8 1993 Shonekan 11 1993 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
475008 475 11 1993 Abacha 6 1998 Reshuffle Coup Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
475009 475 6 1998 Abubakar 5 1999 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
481001 481 8 1960 Mba 11 1967 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Irregular, Other 0
481002 481 11 1967 Bongo 6 2009 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
481003 481 6 2009 Rogombe 10 2009 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
481004 481 10 2009 Ondimba Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
482001 482 8 1960 Dacko 1 1966 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
482002 482 1 1966 Bokassa 9 1979 Regime-Change Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
482003 482 9 1979 Dacko 9 1981 Foreign Installation Regime-Change Coup Foreign Military Coup 0
482004 482 9 1981 Kolingba 10 1993 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
482005 482 3 2003 Francois Bozize 3 2013 Successful Rebellion Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
482006 482 3 2013 Djotidia 1 2014 Successful Rebellion Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
482007 482 1 2014 Nguendet 1 2014 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
482008 482 1 2014 Samba-Panza 3 2016 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Still in Office 0
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483001 483 8 1960 Tombalbaye 4 1975 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
483002 483 4 1975 Malloum 3 1979 Regime-Change Coup Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
483003 483 3 1979 Oueddei 6 1982 Successful Rebellion Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
483004 483 6 1982 Habre 12 1990 Successful Rebellion Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
483005 483 12 1990 Deby Successful Rebellion Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
484001 484 8 1960 Youlou 8 1963 First Election/Selection Protest Regular Protest 0
484002 484 8 1963 Debat 9 1968 Forced Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
484003 484 9 1968 Raoul 1 1969 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
484004 484 1 1969 Ngouabi 3 1977 First Election/Selection Assassination Regular Military Coup 0
484005 484 3 1977 Opango 2 1979 Forced Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
484006 484 2 1979 Nguesso 8 1992 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
484007 484 10 1997 Nguesso Successful Rebellion Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
490001 490 9 1960 Kasavubu 11 1965 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
490002 490 11 1965 Mobutu 5 1997 Regime-Change Coup Rebellion Irregular Regular 0
490003 490 5 1997 Laurent Kabila 1 2001 Successful Rebellion Assassination Regular Military Coup 0
490004 490 1 2001 Joseph Kabila Forced Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
500001 500 10 1962 Obote 1 1971 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
500002 500 1 1971 Amin 4 1979 Regime-Change Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
500003 500 4 1979 Yusuf Lule 6 1979 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
500004 500 6 1979 Binaisa 5 1980 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
500005 500 5 1980 Paulo Muwanga 12 1980 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
500006 500 12 1980 Obote 7 1985 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
500007 500 7 1985 Okello 1 1986 Reshuffle Coup Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
500008 500 1 1986 Museveni Successful Rebellion Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
501001 501 12 1963 Kenyatta 8 1978 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
501002 501 8 1978 Moi 12 2002 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
510001 510 11 1961 Nyerere 11 1985 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
510002 510 11 1985 Mwinyi 11 1995 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
510003 510 11 1995 Mkapa 12 2005 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
510004 510 12 2005 Kikwete 11 2015 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
510005 510 11 2015 Magufuli Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
516001 516 7 1962 Mwambutsa 7 1966 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
516002 516 7 1966 Ntare 11 1966 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
516003 516 11 1966 Micombero 11 1976 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
516004 516 11 1976 Bagaza 9 1987 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
516005 516 9 1987 Buyoya 7 1993 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
516006 516 7 1996 Buyoya 4 2003 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
516007 516 4 2003 Ndayizeye 8 2005 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
517001 517 10 1961 Kayibanda 7 1973 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
517002 517 7 1973 Habyarimana 4 1994 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Irregular, Other 0
517003 517 4 1994 Sindikubwabo 7 1994 Forced Election/Selection Rebellion Irregular Regular 1
517004 517 7 1994 Paul Kagame Successful Rebellion Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
520001 520 10 1969 Siad Barre 1 1991 Regime-Change Coup Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
522001 522 6 1977 Gouled Aptidon 5 1999 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
522002 522 5 1999 Guelleh Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
530001 530 9 1974 Andom 11 1974 Regime-Change Coup Assassination Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
530002 530 11 1974 Banti 2 1977 Forced Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
530003 530 2 1977 Mengistu Marriam 5 1991 Reshuffle Coup Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
530004 530 5 1991 Gebre Kidan 5 1991 Forced Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
530005 530 5 1991 Meles Zenawi 8 2012 Successful Rebellion Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
530006 530 8 2012 Desalegn First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
531001 531 5 1993 Afeworki Successful Rebellion Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
540001 540 11 1975 Neto 9 1979 Successful Rebellion Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
540002 540 9 1979 Dos Santos First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
541001 541 6 1975 Machel 10 1986 Successful Rebellion Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
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541002 541 11 1986 Chissano 2 2005 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
541003 541 2 2005 Guebuza 1 2015 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
541004 541 1 2015 Nyussi Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
551001 551 10 1964 Kaunda 11 1991 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
551002 551 1 2002 Levy Mwanawasa 8 2008 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
551003 551 8 2008 Banda 9 2011 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
552001 552 11 1965 Smith 5 1979 Regular Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Regular 0
552002 552 5 1979 Muzorewa 12 1979 Successful Rebellion Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
552003 552 3 1980 Mugabe First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
553001 553 7 1964 Banda 5 1994 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
560001 560 12 1954 Strijdom 8 1958 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Natural Death 0
560002 560 8 1958 Swart 9 1958 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
560003 560 9 1958 Verwoerd 9 1966 Regular Election/Selection Assassination Regular Assassination by Unsupported Individual 0
560004 560 9 1966 Donges 9 1966 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
560005 560 9 1966 Vorster 9 1978 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
560006 560 9 1978 Botha 1 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
560007 560 1 1989 Heunis 3 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
560008 560 3 1989 Botha 8 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
560009 560 8 1989 deKlerk 5 1994 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
565001 565 3 1990 Nujoma 3 2005 Successful Rebellion Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
565002 565 3 2005 Pohamba 3 2015 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
565003 565 3 2015 Geingob Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
570001 570 1 1986 Lekhanya 5 1991 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
570002 570 5 1991 Ramaema 4 1993 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
571001 571 9 1966 Khama 7 1980 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
571002 571 7 1980 Masire 3 1998 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
571003 571 3 1998 Mogae 3 2008 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
571004 571 3 2008 Ian Khama Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
572001 572 9 1968 Subhuza II 8 1982 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
572002 572 8 1982 Dzeliwe Shongwe 8 1983 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Removed by Other Government Actors 1
572003 572 8 1983 Ntombe Thwala 4 1986 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
572004 572 4 1986 Mswati First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
580001 580 6 1960 Tsiranana 10 1972 First Election/Selection Protest Regular Protest 0
580002 580 10 1972 Ramanantsoa 2 1975 Forced Election/Selection Legal Removal Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
580003 580 2 1975 Ratsimandrava 2 1975 Forced Election/Selection Assassination Irregular Military Coup 0
580004 580 2 1975 Gilles Andriamahazo 6 1975 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
580005 580 6 1975 Ratsiraka 3 1993 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
580006 580 3 2009 Rajoelina 1 2014 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
581001 581 7 1975 Abdallah 8 1975 First Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Irregular Rebellion 0
581002 581 8 1975 Soilih 5 1978 Foreign Installation Foreign Overthrow Irregular Military Coup 0
581003 581 5 1978 Bob Denard 12 1989 Foreign Installation Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
581004 581 12 1989 Djohar 9 1995 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
581005 581 9 1995 Bob Denard 10 1995 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Foreign 1
581006 581 10 1995 el-Yachroutu 1 1996 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
581007 581 1 1996 Djohar 3 1996 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
581008 581 3 1996 Abdoulkarim 11 1998 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
581009 581 11 1998 Massounde 4 1999 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
581010 581 4 1999 Azali Assoumani 1 2002 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
581011 581 1 2002 Hamada Madi 5 2002 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
581012 581 5 2002 Azali Assoumani 5 2006 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
591001 591 4 2004 Michel Regular Election/Selection Still in Power NA NA 0
600001 600 3 1956 Mohammed V 2 1961 First Election/Selection Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
600002 600 2 1961 Hassan II 7 1999 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
600003 600 7 1999 Muhammad VI Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
615001 615 7 1962 Ben Khedda 9 1962 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
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615002 615 9 1962 Bella 6 1965 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
615003 615 6 1965 Boumedienne 12 1978 Reshuffle Coup Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
615004 615 12 1978 Bitat 2 1979 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
615005 615 2 1979 Benjedid 1 1992 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
615006 615 1 1992 Boudiaf 6 1992 Regime-Change Coup Assassination Irregular Rebellion 0
615007 615 7 1992 Kafi 1 1994 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
615008 615 1 1994 Zeroual 4 1999 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
615009 615 4 1999 Bouteflika Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
616001 616 2 1956 Muhammad al-Amin 7 1957 First Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
616002 616 7 1957 Ben Ali Bourguiba 11 1987 Forced Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
616003 616 11 1987 Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali 1 2011 Reshuffle Coup Protest Irregular Protest 0
616004 616 1 2011 Mebazaa 12 2011 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
616005 616 12 2011 Marzouki 12 2014 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
620001 620 12 1951 Idris 9 1969 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
620002 620 9 1969 Qaddafi 8 2011 Regime-Change Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Rebellion 0
625001 625 11 1958 Abboud 11 1964 Regime-Change Coup Protest Irregular Protest 0
625002 625 11 1964 al-Khalifa 6 1965 Successful Protest Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
625003 625 5 1969 Nimeiri 4 1985 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
625004 625 4 1985 Abdul Rahman Swaredahab 5 1986 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
625005 625 6 1989 Al-Bashir Regime-Change Coup Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
626001 626 7 2011 Kiir Forced Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
630001 630 4 1951 Mohammad Mossadeg 8 1953 First Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
630002 630 8 1953 Mohammad Reza 1 1979 Foreign Installation Protest Irregular Protest 0
630003 630 2 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini 6 1989 Successful Protest Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 1
630004 630 6 1989 Khamenei 8 1989 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
630005 630 8 1989 Rafsanjani 8 1997 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
630006 630 8 1997 Khatami 8 2005 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
630007 630 8 2005 Ahmadinejad 8 2013 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
630008 630 8 2013 Rouhani Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
640001 640 5 1960 Gursel 11 1961 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
640002 640 9 1980 Evren 11 1983 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
645001 645 5 1953 Faisal II 7 1958 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
645002 645 7 1958 Karrim Kassem 2 1963 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
645003 645 2 1963 Salem Aref 4 1966 Regime-Change Coup Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
645004 645 4 1966 Rahmen Aref 7 1968 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
645005 645 7 1968 Hassan Al-Bakr 7 1979 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
645006 645 7 1979 Saddam Hussein 4 2003 Regular Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Regular Foreign 0
645007 645 4 2003 Tommy Ray Franks 4 2003 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Foreign Regular 1
645008 645 4 2003 Jay Garner 5 2003 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Foreign Regular 1
645009 645 5 2003 Paul Bremer 6 2004 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Foreign Regular 0
645010 645 6 2004 Iyad Allawi 5 2005 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
645011 645 5 2005 al-Jaafari 5 2006 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
645012 645 5 2006 al-Maliki 9 2014 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
651001 651 7 1952 Naguib 11 1954 Regime-Change Coup Legal Removal Irregular Regular 0
651002 651 11 1954 Nasser 9 1970 Forced Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
651003 651 9 1970 Sadat 10 1981 First Election/Selection Assassination Regular Irregular, Other 0
651004 651 10 1981 Mubarak 2 2011 Forced Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Protest 0
651005 651 2 2011 Tantawi 6 2012 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
651006 651 7 2013 Mansour 6 2014 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Regular 0
651007 651 6 2014 al-Sisi Regime-Change Coup Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
652001 652 2 1958 Nasser (president of UAR) 9 1961 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
652002 652 9 1961 Al-kuzbari 12 1961 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
652003 652 12 1961 El-Kudsi 3 1962 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
652004 652 3 1962 Zahreddin 4 1962 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Regular 0
652005 652 4 1962 El-Kudsi 3 1963 Reshuffle Coup Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
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652006 652 3 1963 Atassi, L. 7 1963 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Removed by Military Power Struggle 1
652007 652 7 1963 Al-Hafiz 2 1966 Forced Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
652008 652 2 1966 El-Atassi, N. 11 1970 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
652009 652 11 1970 Al-Khatib 2 1971 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
652010 652 2 1971 Al-Assad H. 6 2000 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
652011 652 6 2000 Bashar al-Assad Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
660001 660 9 1976 Sarkis 9 1982 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
660002 660 9 1982 Gemayel, Amin 9 1988 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
660003 660 9 1988 Aoun 11 1989 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
660004 660 11 1989 Moawad 11 1989 Regular Election/Selection Assassination Regular Rebellion 0
660005 660 11 1989 Elias Hrawi 11 1998 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
660006 660 11 1998 Emile Lahoud 11 2007 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
663001 663 7 1951 Abdullah El-Hashim 9 1951 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
663002 663 9 1951 Ibn Abdullah-Hashim 8 1952 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
663003 663 8 1952 Hussein Ibn Talal El-Hashim 2 1999 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
663004 663 2 1999 Abdullah Ibn Hussein El-Hashimi Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
670001 670 11 1953 Saud 11 1964 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Regular 0
670002 670 11 1964 Faisal 3 1975 Reshuffle Coup Assassination Regular Assassination by Unsupported Individual 0
670003 670 3 1975 Khalid 6 1982 Forced Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
670004 670 6 1982 Fahd 1 1996 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
670005 670 1 1996 Abdullah 1 2015 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
670006 670 1 2015 Salman Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Natural Death 0
678001 678 9 1962 Al-Badr 9 1962 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
678002 678 9 1962 AL-Sallal 11 1967 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
678003 678 11 1967 Al-Iryani 6 1974 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
678004 678 6 1974 Al-Hamadi 10 1977 Regime-Change Coup Assassination Irregular Irregular, Other 0
678005 678 10 1977 Al-Ghashmi 6 1978 Forced Election/Selection Assassination Regular Assassination by Unsupported Individual 0
678006 678 7 1978 Saleh al-Hashidi 5 1990 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
679001 679 5 1990 Saleh al-Hashidi 2 2012 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
679002 679 2 2012 Hadi 2 2015 Regular Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Still in Office 0
679003 679 2 2015 Houthi Successful Rebellion Still in Power NA NA 0
680001 680 11 1967 Al-Shaabi 6 1969 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
680002 680 6 1969 Ali Rubayyi 6 1978 Reshuffle Coup Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
680003 680 6 1978 Ali Nassir Hassani 12 1978 Successful Rebellion Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
680004 680 12 1978 Ismail 4 1980 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
680005 680 4 1980 Ali Nassir Hassani 1 1986 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Irregular, Other 0
680006 680 1 1986 Attas 5 1990 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
690001 690 1 1950 Abdullah As-Sabah 11 1965 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
690002 690 11 1965 Sabah As-Sabah 12 1977 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
690003 690 1 1978 Jabir As-Sabah 8 1990 Regular Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Regular Foreign 0
690004 690 8 1990 Saddam Hussein 4 1991 Foreign Installation Foreign Overthrow Foreign Foreign 0
690005 690 4 1991 Jabir As-Sabah 1 2006 Foreign Installation Natural Death Foreign Natural Death 0
690006 690 1 2006 Saad Salim at Sabah 1 2006 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
690007 690 1 2006 Jabir Ahmad Al Sabah Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
692001 692 8 1971 Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah 3 1999 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
692002 692 3 1999 Hamad Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
694001 694 9 1971 Ahmed Ath-Thani 2 1972 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
694002 694 2 1972 Khalifah Ath-Thani 6 1995 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
694003 694 6 1995 Amad Al Thani 6 2013 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
694004 694 6 2013 Tamim Al Thani First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
696001 696 12 1971 An-Nahayan 11 2004 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
696002 696 11 2004 Khalifa Al Nahayan Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
698001 698 7 1970 Qabus Bin Said Reshuffle Coup Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
700001 700 9 1953 Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan 3 1963 Forced Election/Selection Legal Removal Irregular Regular 0
700002 700 3 1963 Mohammad Yusuf 11 1965 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
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700003 700 11 1965 Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal 10 1967 Regular Election/Selection Resignation, Health Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
700004 700 10 1967 Abdallah Yakta 11 1967 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
700005 700 11 1967 Nur Ahmad Etemadi 6 1971 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
700006 700 6 1971 Abdul Zahir 12 1972 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
700007 700 12 1972 Mohammad Musa Shafiq 7 1973 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
700008 700 7 1973 Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan 4 1978 Regime-Change Coup Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
700009 700 4 1978 Taraki 3 1979 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
700010 700 3 1979 Amin 12 1979 Reshuffle Coup Foreign Overthrow Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
700011 700 12 1979 Karmal 5 1986 Foreign Installation Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
700012 700 5 1986 Najibullah 4 1992 Foreign Installation Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
700013 700 4 1992 Mojadidi 6 1992 Successful Rebellion Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
700014 700 6 1992 Burhanuddin Rabbani 9 1996 First Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
700015 700 9 1996 Mullah Omar 11 2001 Successful Rebellion Foreign Overthrow Irregular Rebellion 0
700016 700 12 2001 Hamid Karzai 9 2014 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Foreign Regular 0
700017 700 9 2014 Ashraf Ghani First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
701001 701 10 1990 Niyazov 12 2006 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
701002 701 12 2006 Berdymukhammedov Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
702001 702 8 1991 Kadreddin Aslonov 9 1991 First Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Regular 0
702002 702 9 1991 Nabiyev 9 1992 Forced Election/Selection Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
702003 702 9 1992 Iskandrov 11 1992 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
702004 702 11 1992 Rakhmonov First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Regular 0
703001 703 10 1990 Akayev 4 2005 First Election/Selection Protest Regular Protest 0
703002 703 4 2005 Bakiyev 4 2010 Forced Election/Selection Protest Regular Protest 0
703003 703 4 2010 Otunbayeva 12 2011 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
703004 703 12 2011 Atambayev Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
704001 704 3 1990 Karimov First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
705001 705 4 1990 Nazarbaev First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
710001 710 10 1976 Hua Guofeng 9 1980 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
710002 710 9 1980 Deng Xiaoping 2 1997 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
710003 710 2 1997 Jiang Zemin 3 2003 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
710004 710 3 2003 Hu Jintao 11 2012 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
710005 710 11 2012 Xi Jinping Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
712001 712 1 1952 Tsedenbal 8 1984 Regular Election/Selection Foreign Overthrow Regular Foreign 0
712002 712 8 1984 Batmonkh 3 1990 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
712003 712 3 1990 Ochirbat 6 1997 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
731001 731 7 1994 Kim Jong-Il 12 2011 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
731002 731 12 2011 Kim Jong Un Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
732001 732 5 1961 Chang Do Yong 7 1961 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
732002 732 7 1961 Hee Park 10 1979 Reshuffle Coup Assassination Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
732003 732 10 1979 Choi Kuy Hay 8 1980 Forced Election/Selection Protest Regular Regular 0
732004 732 8 1980 Park Choong Hoon 8 1980 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
732005 732 8 1980 Chun Doo Hwan 2 1988 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760001 760 3 1952 Wangchuk, Jigme Dorji 7 1972 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
760002 760 7 1972 Wangchuck, Jigme Singye 7 1998 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760003 760 7 1998 Lyonpo Jigme Thinley 7 1999 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760004 760 7 1999 Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup 7 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760005 760 7 2000 Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba 8 2001 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760006 760 8 2001 Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk 8 2002 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760007 760 8 2002 Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji 8 2003 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760008 760 8 2003 Lyonpo Jigme Thinley 8 2004 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760009 760 8 2004 Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba 9 2005 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760010 760 9 2005 Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup 9 2006 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760011 760 9 2006 Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk 7 2007 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
760012 760 7 2007 Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji 4 2008 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
770001 770 10 1951 Nazimuddin 4 1953 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
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770002 770 4 1953 Mohammed Ali 8 1955 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
770003 770 8 1955 Chaudhri M. Ali 9 1956 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
770004 770 9 1956 Shahid Suhrawardy 10 1957 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
770005 770 10 1957 Chundrigar 12 1957 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
770006 770 12 1957 Khan Noon 10 1958 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
770007 770 10 1958 Ayub Khan 3 1969 Regime-Change Coup Protest Irregular Protest 0
770008 770 3 1969 Yahya Khan 12 1971 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
770009 770 7 1977 Zia 8 1988 Regime-Change Coup Assassination Irregular Irregular, Other 0
770010 770 8 1988 Ishaq Khan 12 1988 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
770011 770 10 1999 Musharraf 8 2008 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
771001 771 4 1971 Syed Nazrul Islam 1 1972 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
771002 771 1 1972 Sheikh Mujib Rahman 8 1975 Regular Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
771003 771 8 1975 Moshtaque Ahmed 11 1975 Regime-Change Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
771004 771 11 1975 Ziaur Rahman 5 1981 Reshuffle Coup Assassination Irregular Military Coup 0
771005 771 5 1981 Sattar 3 1982 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
771006 771 3 1982 Ershad 12 1990 Regime-Change Coup Protest Irregular Protest 0
771007 771 1 2007 Fakhruddin 1 2009 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Regular 0
775001 775 10 1958 Ne Win 3 1960 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
775002 775 3 1962 Ne Win 7 1988 Regime-Change Coup Protest Irregular Regular 0
775003 775 7 1988 Sein Lwin 8 1988 Forced Election/Selection Protest Irregular Regular 0
775004 775 8 1988 Maung Maung 9 1988 Forced Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
775005 775 9 1988 Saw Maung 4 1992 Regime-Change Coup Resignation, Health Irregular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
775006 775 4 1992 Than Shwe 3 2011 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
775007 775 3 2011 Thein Sein 3 2016 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Still in Office 0
775008 775 3 2016 Htin Kyaw Regular Election/Selection Still in Power NA NA 0
780001 780 1 1989 Premadasa 5 1993 Regular Election/Selection Assassination Regular Irregular, Other 0
780002 780 5 1993 Wijetunge 11 1994 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
781001 781 7 1965 Nasir 11 1978 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
781002 781 11 1978 Gayoom 11 2008 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
790001 790 2 1951 Tribhuvan 3 1955 Successful Rebellion Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
790002 790 3 1955 Mahendra 1 1972 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
790003 790 1 1972 Birendra 11 1990 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
790004 790 11 1990 Krishna Prasad Bhatterai 5 1991 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
790005 790 10 2002 Lokendra Bahadur Chand 6 2003 Forced Election/Selection Protest Regular Regular 0
790006 790 6 2003 Surya Bahadur Thapa 6 2004 Forced Election/Selection Protest Regular Regular 0
790007 790 6 2004 Sher Bahdur Deuba 2 2005 Forced Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Regular 0
790008 790 2 2005 Gyanendra 4 2006 Forced Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Protest 0
800001 800 9 1957 Pote Sarasin 12 1957 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
800002 800 12 1957 Thanon Kittakachorn 10 1958 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
800003 800 10 1958 Sarit 12 1963 Regular Election/Selection Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
800004 800 12 1963 Thanon Kittakachorn 10 1973 Regular Election/Selection Protest Regular Protest 0
800005 800 10 1973 Sanya 2 1975 Successful Protest Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
800006 800 2 1975 Seni Pramoj 3 1975 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Regular 0
800007 800 10 1976 Thanin Kraivichien 10 1977 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Regular Regular 0
800008 800 10 1977 Sangad 11 1977 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
800009 800 11 1977 Kriangsak 2 1980 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
800010 800 3 1980 Prem 8 1988 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
800011 800 3 1991 Panyarachun 4 1992 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
800012 800 4 1992 Kraprayoon 5 1992 First Election/Selection Protest Regular Regular 0
800013 800 9 2006 Chulanont 1 2008 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
800014 800 5 2014 Prayuth Chan-ocha Regime-Change Coup Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
811001 811 11 1953 Sihanouk 3 1970 First Election/Selection Regime-Change Coup Regular Military Coup 0
811002 811 3 1970 Lon Nol 4 1975 Regime-Change Coup Rebellion Irregular Rebellion 0
811003 811 4 1975 Pol Pot 1 1979 Successful Rebellion Foreign Overthrow Irregular Foreign 0
811004 811 1 1979 Heng Samrin 1 1985 Foreign Installation Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
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811005 811 1 1985 Hun Sen 9 1993 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
811006 811 9 1993 Ranariddh 7 1997 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Regular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
811007 811 7 1997 Hun Sen Reshuffle Coup Still in Power Regular Regular 0
812001 812 12 1959 Nosavan 1 1960 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
812002 812 1 1960 Kou Abhay Og Long 5 1960 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 1
812003 812 5 1960 Somsanith 8 1960 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
812004 812 8 1960 Souvanna Phouma 12 1960 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
812005 812 12 1960 Boun Oum 6 1962 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
812006 812 6 1962 Souvanna Phouma 4 1964 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
812007 812 4 1964 Souvanna Phouma 12 1975 Forced Election/Selection Rebellion Regular Rebellion 0
812008 812 12 1975 Phomivan 11 1992 Successful Rebellion Natural Death Irregular Natural Death 0
812009 812 11 1992 Phounsavanh 2 1998 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
812010 812 2 1998 Siphandon 6 2006 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
812011 812 6 2006 Sayasone 4 2016 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Still in Office 0
812012 812 4 2016 Vorachith Regular Election/Selection Still in Power NA NA 0
816001 816 9 1969 Le Duan 7 1986 First Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
816002 816 7 1986 Truong Chinh 12 1986 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
816003 816 12 1986 Nguyen Van Linh 6 1991 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
816004 816 6 1991 Do Muoi 12 1997 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
816005 816 12 1997 Phieu 4 2001 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
816006 816 4 2001 Nong Duc Manh 1 2011 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
816007 816 1 2011 Phu Trong Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
817001 817 1 1954 Pham Buu Loc 6 1954 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
817002 817 6 1954 Quat 6 1954 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
817003 817 6 1954 Ngo Dinh Diem 11 1963 Regular Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
817004 817 11 1963 Minh 1 1964 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
817005 817 1 1964 Khanh 11 1964 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Protest 0
817006 817 11 1964 Van Huong 1 1965 First Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
817007 817 1 1965 Khahn 2 1965 Reshuffle Coup Legal Removal Irregular Removed by Military Power Struggle 0
817008 817 2 1965 Quat 6 1965 Forced Election/Selection Reshuffle Coup Irregular Military Coup 0
817009 817 6 1965 Van Thieu 4 1975 Reshuffle Coup Reshuffle Coup Irregular Foreign 0
820001 820 8 1957 Rahman 4 1959 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
820002 820 4 1959 Razak 8 1959 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
820003 820 8 1959 Rahman 9 1970 Regular Election/Selection Legal Removal Regular Regular 0
820004 820 9 1970 Razak 1 1976 Forced Election/Selection Natural Death Regular Natural Death 0
820005 820 1 1976 Hussein Bin Onn 7 1981 Regular Election/Selection Resignation, Health Regular Retired Due to Ill Health 0
820006 820 7 1981 Mahatir Bin Mohammad 10 2003 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
820007 820 10 2003 Ahmad Badawi 4 2009 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
820008 820 4 2009 Najib Tun Razak Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
830001 830 8 1965 Lee Kuan Yew 11 1990 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
830002 830 11 1990 Goh Chok Tong 8 2004 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
830003 830 8 2004 Lee Hsien Loong Regular Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
835001 835 10 1967 Hassanal Bolkiah First Election/Selection Still in Power Regular Still in Office 0
850001 850 3 1966 Suharto 5 1998 Regime-Change Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
850002 850 5 1998 Habibie 10 1999 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
950001 950 10 1970 Mara 4 1987 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
950002 950 5 1987 Rabuka 12 1987 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Irregular Regular 0
950003 950 12 1987 Mara 6 1992 Forced Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
950004 950 6 1992 Rabuka 5 1999 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 0
950005 950 5 2000 Bainimarama 7 2000 Reshuffle Coup Rebellion Irregular Removed by Other Government Actors 0
950006 950 7 2000 Laisenia Qarase 12 2006 Successful Rebellion Reshuffle Coup Regular Military Coup 0
950007 950 12 2006 Senilagakali 1 2007 Reshuffle Coup Voluntary Resignation Regular Regular 1
950008 950 1 2007 Bainimarama First Election/Selection Still in Power Irregular Still in Office 0
955001 955 6 1970 Tu'ipelehake 8 1991 First Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
955002 955 8 1991 Vaea 1 2000 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
17
955003 955 1 2000 Ulukalala Lavaka Ata (Tupou VI) 2 2006 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
955004 955 2 2006 Sevele 12 2010 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
955005 955 12 2010 Tu'ivakano 12 2014 Regular Election/Selection Voluntary Resignation NA NA 0
955006 955 12 2014 Pohiva Regular Election/Selection Still in Power NA NA 0
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Supporting Appendix B: Additional Empirics
In this section, we run multinomial logit models by recoding the natural death cases as censored cases
as a robustness check. The results are consistent with the results reported in the main text and support
our hypotheses.
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Table 7: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships
Model 1
Dependent Variable Coalition Coalition Coalition Voluntary
Exit Manner Competing Circumventing Collapsing Resignation
Base Category
Entry Manner Irregular Replacement Entry
Independent Variables
Regular Entry 1.893*** -1.810 .312 -.188
( .661 ) ( 1.244) ( .446 ) ( .504 )
Regular × log(Tenure) -.514* .862 -.361 .374*
( .273 ) ( .626 ) ( .265 ) ( .224 )
Irregular Reorganization Entry 2.580*** .430 .356 .488
( .535 ) ( 1.020) ( .533) ( .466 )
Reorganization × log(Tenure) -.778*** .206 .422 .106
( .286 ) ( .718) ( .310) ( .266)
Foreign Entry .735 -.051 -13.744*** -2.637
( 1.811 ) ( .955 ) ( .747 ) ( 2.291 )
Foreign × log(Tenure) .355 .847 .774* 1.109*
( .853) ( .673 ) (.422) ( .661 )
Log(Tenure) .633*** -.591 -.508** -.453**
( .204 ) ( .441 ) ( .221 ) ( .213)
Controls
ln(GDP/capita) -.352** .028 -.207 .119
( .136) ( .150 ) ( .130 ) ( .138 )
GDP Growth -3.237*** -1.802 -.172 -.542
( .867) ( 1.687 ) ( .601 ) (.777 )
Military Dictatorship -.083 .250 .714** .658***
( .300) ( .501 ) ( .340) ( .251 )
Monarchy -2.105*** -.520 -.389 -.804
( .797 ) ( .583 ) ( .592) ( .603 )
Party -2.055*** -.424 -.737** 1.060**
( .398 ) ( .547 ) ( .339) ( .428 )
Ln(Military Personnel) -.167* .077 -.074 .046
( .096) ( .150 ) ( .075 ) ( .061 )
Civil War 1.866*** .906* .395 .255
( .274) ( .473 ) ( .346 ) ( .232)
War Victory -2.394* -7.197** -5.288 -2.333
( 1.244) ( 2.948 ) ( 3.697) ( 1.459)
War Defeat .955* 3.088*** .528 -.016
( .511) ( .586 ) ( .726 ) ( .689)
War Draw -.574 -1.259 -.818 -.855
( .489 ) ( 1.032 ) ( .627) ( .660 )
Age .040*** .047** .025** .044***
( .013) ( .021 ) ( .011 ) ( .010)
Constant -3.673*** -7.123*** -2.562*** -7.380***
( .943 ) ( 1.331) (.902) ( .943 )
Log Likelihood -1287.8302
Observations 3613
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered with country.
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Table 8: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Manner of Losing Office in Dictatorships
Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable Coalition Coalition Coalition Voluntary Coalition Coalition Coalition Voluntary
Exit Manner Competing Circumventing Collapsing Resignation Competing Circumventing Collapsing Resignation
Base Category
Entry Manner Regular Entry Irregular Reorganization Entry
Irregular Replacement Entry
Rebel Entry -2.150*** -.342 -2.302* 1.812** -2.810*** -2.438** -2.422** 1.202
( .644 ) ( 1.417) ( 1.220) (.760) ( .573) ( 1.171 ) ( 1.202 ) ( .796)
Rebel × log(Tenure) .470 .040 1.099*** -1.258** .725* .583 .310 -.986*
( .384) ( .629) (.344 ) (.563) ( .413) ( .668 ) ( .338) ( .577)
Regime-Change Coup Entry -1.838** 2.505* -.194 -.379 -2.525*** .157 -.222 -1.056**
( .783) ( 1.393) ( .457 ) (.577) ( .613) ( 1.080) ( .536) ( .518)
Regime-Change Coup × log(Tenure) .524* -1.112 .334 -.131 .778*** -.441 -.466 .127
( .292 ) ( .691) ( .273 ) ( .244) ( .296 ) ( .765 ) ( .312) ( .284)
Irregular Reorganization Entry
Reshuffling Coup Entry .130 1.837 .134 .813**
( .834) ( 1.293) ( .558 ) ( .378)
Reshuffling Coup × log(Tenure) .161 -.048 .635** -.421
( .369 ) ( .629) ( .314) ( .258 )
Irregular Selection Entry 1.460** 3.587*** -.204 .462
( .705) ( 1.294 ) ( .511) ( .459 )
Irregular Selection × log(Tenure) -1.194* -20.672*** 1.145*** -.097
( .675) ( 1.465 ) ( .302) ( .311)
Regular Entry
Regular First-Election Entry -.590 -1.642 .175 -.315
( .727) ( 1.217) ( .530 ) ( .409)
Regular First-Election × log(Tenure) .150 .297 -1.073*** -.018
( .356 ) ( .713 ) ( .308) ( .249)
Regular Election Entry -.919 -3.024 -.323 -.841**
( .763) (2.133 ) ( .469) ( .367 )
Regular Election × log(Tenure) .453 .967 -.509* .521**
( .411 ) ( 1.018) ( .303) ( .247 )
Foreign Entry -1.135 1.866 -16.383*** -2.407 -1.893 -.578 -14.206*** -3.079
( 1.690 ) ( 1.358) (.761 ) ( 2.217) (1.761) ( .835 ) ( .816) (2.161)
Foreign × log(Tenure) .857 -.015 1.160*** .723 1.145 .622 .366 1.045*
( .831) ( .743 ) ( .403 ) ( .641) ( .878) ( .661) ( .416) ( .617 )
Log(Tenure) .121 .292 -.870*** -.074 -.143 -.365 -.086 -.339*
( .192 ) ( .473) ( .191 ) (.129) ( .265) ( .575 ) ( .196) ( .191)
Controls
ln(GDP/capita) -.352** -.011 -.202 .125 -.370*** .025 -.222* .073
( .138 ) ( .159 ) (.127) ( .140 ) ( .135) ( .163 ) ( .130) ( .141 )
GDP Growth -3.063*** -1.290 -.154 -.521 -3.176*** -1.552 -.152 -.501
( .850) ( 1.755 ) ( .635) ( .774) ( .865) (1.733) ( .584) (.770)
Military Dictatorship -.153 .025 .683* .723*** -.122 -.013 .605* .812***
( .399) ( .661 ) ( .351 ) ( .256) ( .327) ( .603) ( .361 ) (.249)
Monarchy -2.201*** -.640 -.304 -.829 -2.100*** -.526 -.375 -.858
( .817 ) ( .622 ) ( .586) ( .591) ( .794) (.579 ) ( .582 ) ( .546)
Party -2.104*** -.438 -.685* .998** -2.038*** -.328 -.681** .929**
( .409 ) ( .572 ) (.351) ( .426 ) ( .417 ) ( .566) ( .332) ( .395 )
Ln(Military Personnel) -.153 .084 -.079 .045 -.178* .054 -.081 .005
( .095) ( .154 ) ( .076) ( .062) ( .096 ) (.156 ) ( .077) ( .062)
Civil War 1.862*** 1.005** .429 .222 1.873*** .957** .429 .251
( .272 ) ( .474) ( .346 ) ( .232 ) ( .275 ) ( .484 ) ( .350) ( .231 )
War Victory -2.319* -7.467** -6.136 -2.480 -2.369* -7.310** -5.233 -2.201*
( 1.219) ( 3.258 ) ( 4.100) ( 1.538) ( 1.206) ( 3.169 ) ( 3.708 ) ( 1.328 )
War Defeat 1.006** 3.602*** .486 -.182 .937* 3.304*** .651 -.113
( .481) ( .647 ) (.734 ) (.675 ) ( .514) ( .625 ) ( .732) ( .660)
War Draw -.543 -1.628 -.791 -.809 -.542 -1.335 -.805 -.815
( .496) ( 1.241 ) (.626) ( .652 ) ( .482 ) ( 1.099 ) (.640 ) ( .661)
Age .039*** .048** .021** .044*** .040*** .047** .024** .049***
( .013) ( .023 ) ( .010) ( .010) ( .013 ) ( .022) ( .011) ( .011 )
Constant -1.697* -8.855*** -2.137** -7.580*** -.951 -6.578*** -2.016* -6.683***
( .947 ) ( 1.936 ) ( .988 ) ( 1.121) ( 1.000) (1.656) ( 1.081) ( .996 )
Log Likelihood -1273.5628 -1276.876
Observations 3613 3613
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed). Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered with country.
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Supporting Appendix C: Additional Figures
Figure 6: Effect of Reshuffling-Coup, Forced Selection, First-Election and Regular-Election
Entry on Coalition-Competing Removal
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Note: We use Model 2 in Table 5 to estimate the first difference.
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